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PROMOTING RACIAL EQUALITY THROUGH EQUAL
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY: THE CASE FOR
PROGRESSIVE SCHOOL-CHOICE

Brian P. Marron'
A brief satirical narrative illustrates the plight of too many
students trapped in inadequate schools despite more than forty
years of education reform.
A young boy rings a doorbell. A thin, old man with a white
goatee and a red, white, and blue striped hat opens the door.
"Hello, little fellow, are you lost?" the man asks.
"No, my mommy says I'm a big boy now," responds the child
as he shows the man four fingers. "She told me to go see Uncle
Sam for some school."
The man responds with a warm smile, "Well, you've come to
the right place little man. What is your name?"
'\Johnny."
"Well, Johnny, your mommy is a very smart woman. She
knows that every boy and girl needs an education to grow up
and have a nice job. Where do you live?"
"Anderson Homes."
"I know where that is. I send the boys and girls from that
part of the city to PS-123."
Johnny replies, "Mommy says to ask you to send me somewhere else."
"Now why is that?" asks the old man, puzzled.
"Mommy went to school there. She says it was a bad
school."
"You don't have to go there. Pryvatt Academy is a good
school in your neighborhood."
' The author is Editor-in-Chief of MARGINS: Maryland's Interdisciplinary Publication
on Race, Religion, Gender, and Class. He will receive his Juris Doctorate from the University of Maryland School of Law in May 2002. He received a Bachelor of Arts in
Criminology and Criminal Justice, Government and Politics in 1998 from the University of Maryland, College Park. The author would like to thank Professor Barbara Bezdek and .Jennifer Gresock for their comments on an earlier draft.
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"I can't. Mommy says only rich boys and girls go there. We
don't have enough money."
"Tell your mommy that she should move outside of the city.
They have free schools there, too."
"Mommy says we can't afford to move."
"Well, Johnny, then you must go to PS-123."
"But my mommy said ... "
"Now, Johnny, it won't be so bad" the man interrupted. "My
friends in Washington are sending more money for that school
to get better; in ten years it will be a good school."
"I go to school now. My mommy said getting any bad learning will ruin me and send me to jail" the boy explains with
moistening eyes. "I don't want to go to jail!"
"There, there, Johnny. Don't cry."
"Can you give my mommy some money? I want to go to a
good school like Pryvatt Academy."
"I can't do that Johnny."
"Why?"
"Because my friends in Washington and in Capital City
have friends that work in public schools. Their friends are
afraid that if I give your mommy money that they won't get
money" the old man replied. "My friends in Washington and in
Capital City also have friends that don't want me to give you
money because they are afraid you will use it to go to a church
school. You see Johnny, my friends don't want to hurt the feelings of their friends because their friends helped them get their
nice jobs in Washington and Capital City. Do you understand
Johnny?"
"Not really. Does my mommy have any friends in Washington?"
"Yes, she does, Johnny. But her friends also have a lot of
friends that work in public schools."
Seeing the boy frown, the old man continued. "Tell you
what, Johnny, if you be a good boy and go to PS-123, I promise
we will give your school more and more money every year.
Then, when it is time for your kids to go to PS-123, it will be a
good school."
As Johnny turned to walk home, his head hanging low, he
kicked a small rock and mumbled, "That's what you told
grandma, too."
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This narrative illustrates how the United States' public
education system denies poverty stricken children an adequate
education. A sufficient public education provides the tools
needed for each child to function in the modern economy and
achieve at least a modest standard of living. Unfortunately,
children in poverty in the U.S. are not getting those tools.
Instead of serving schools that are as equally impoverished
as the children's neighborhood or home, Diane Ravitch, a research professor of education at New York University and the
Brown chair in education policy at the Washington-based
Brookings Institution, argues that adequate public schools
should pull the child up out of poverty. She points out that
while "(s]chools cannot create economic activity or jobs, only
they can teach children the knowledge and skills without which
1
they cannot improve their life prospects." Without adequate
education for all children, the American dream becomes a
nightmare. The history of twentieth century public education
in the United States proves that education reforms targeted at
individual problems within the system's framework are largely
unsuccessful. Consequently, an attempt at broad structural reform of the public educational system is needed. This paper
2
proposes that a public education system founded on "school
choice," allowing parents to choose where their children attend
school, provides the best solution to insure that all United
States citizens, including children in poverty, are offered an
adequate education.

1. Brookings Papers on Education Policy: 1999 at 3 (Diane Ravitch ed., Brookings Instn. Press 1999).
2. The education policy debate should recognize an important distinction between the terms "public education" and "public school." Public education is the government commitment to ensure that each of its citizens receive an education. Governments have created public schools to meet the goal of providing public education.
Public education can also be provided by the government through other means such as
subsidizing the education of children at home, with tutors, or at private schools. The
key to this definition of "public education" is the traditional egalitarian concept of education for all. Public schools are just one means to make this possible. Many commentators on education policy who staunchly support "public schools" are in fact touting
the historical contributions of "public education" to American society. A major misperception held by school choice opponents is that the only way the government can provide public education is through public schools. This is not true. As long as the government is providing the means for the child to receive an education it is part of the
public education system. In this way the government is still meeting its obligation to
prepare its citizens for adulthood. Unfortunately, some choice opponents believe public
schools and public education are synonymous.

56

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2002

The most promising educational reform that can be used as
a means for achieving racial equality and poverty reduction is a
3
progressive version of school choice. Generally, a public education system based on choice allows parents to select which
school their children attend. This gives parents the freedom to
move their children out of ineffective schools while at the same
time motivating the ineffective schools to improve. An educational system based on school choice may provide the best way
to ensure that all Americans enter adulthood with a functional
education. By equipping all citizens with an adequate education, the government provides the equal opportunity that will
in the long term minimize the racial and class inequalities
prevalent in American society.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Introducing "Progressive" School Choice
The debate surrounding school choice or "vouchers" has
been traditionally led by the politically conservative. Until the
1990s, the "voucher" movement was based in conservatism and
religion with prominent supporters including Milton Friedman
4
and President Ronald Reagan. The conservative wing of the
school choice movement advocated an education system relying
solely on market principles-vouchers should be available to all
5
children with little or no government regulation of the process.
The conservative universalist approach gave rise to (and validates some) opposition to the use ofvouchers.
3. Progressive school choice differs from what most people think of as "school
choice." Traditionally school choice, usually described as "vouchers," has been thought
of as a way for all children to be able to take their share of educational funds and apply
them to tuition at a private school. Progressive school choice rejects this universal approach by acknowledging that most families already have school choice; they can afford
to move to a different public school district or afford private school tuition. Progressive
school choice is limited to the children that need choice-those from low income families who are trapped in inadequate public schools. Progressive school choice is a centrist alternative to the school choice/voucher philosophy advocated by political conservatives. See generally, Brian P. Marron, The Final Reform: A Centrist Vision of School
Choice, 8 Geo. J. Pov. L. & Policy 321 (2001) (for more on this distinction see Part V
infra).
4. See Terry M. Moe, Schools, Vouchers, and the American Public 32 (2001).
5. !d. at 35 ("Many conservatives in its ranks continue to see vouchers in universalistic and market oriented terms. In their view, all children should get vouchers, and
the entire education system should be reformed via choice and competition.").
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However, conservative voucher supporters have benefited
greatly from the rise of another wing of the school choice
movement. In the 1970s, sociologist Christopher Jencks and
law professors John Coons and Stephen Sugarman began to
write about the potential applications of school choice in pro6
moting equity and social justice. They found that school choice
could be useful in "giving greater control to families and in
helping ameliorate the social inequities that ... were rooted in
7
the current system." Yet, in the 1970s and 1980s, their innovative vision of school choice failed to gather much support as
limited pilot programs were abandoned and ballot initiatives
8
failed.
Progressive school choice emerged again in the 1990s with a
victory in Milwaukee led by State Representative Polly Wil9
liams and Marquette University professor Howard Fuller.
They were able to push a limited voucher proposal through the
Wisconsin legislature. This limited program, discussed more
fully below in Part II, was based on progressive school choice
principles that target participation of those children who need
it the most. To members of this growing progressive wing of the
school choice movement,
vouchers are not just about choice, competition and performance incentives. Nor are they necessarily for all children.
They are about bringing equal opportunity to the children in
greatest need, and about using regulations to channel markets in the right directions. The ideas of Jencks, Coons and
Sugarman, once on the peripherlo of the movement, are now
0
fueling its growth and diversity."

Unfortunately, school choice or "vouchers" has continued to
be stereotyped by mainstream American political culture (including the mass media, major political parties and organiza-

6. !d. at 22-23.

7. ld. at 22.
8. !d. at 22-23.
9. ld. at 33.
10. Id at 35.
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tions) as a conservative program. It fails to recognize the
growing support for a more centrist approach to school choice.
The support for progressive school choice differs from conservative supporters in several ways. First, the progressive
wing of the school choice movement recognizes that the current
public education system serves most children well. Therefore,
government subsidized choice is only needed for low income
families who reside in districts with inadequate public
12
schools. This differs from the view of traditional conservative
voucher supporters who believe that all children should receive
vouchers.
Second, progressive school choice supporters are not focused
on religion, per se. Religious schools should be included in
school choice plans simply because they provide more options.
Progressive supporters of school choice, like most Americans,
are not anti-religion. They will accept the minimal risk of the
mere appearance of government-religion entanglement for the
sake of educating and restoring the promise of the American
13
dream to society's at-risk children. Progressive school choice

11. A search of the LEXIS-NEXIS electronic database of United States newspapers over the past five years using Boolean search terms of "(vouchers or "school
choice") w/5 conservative" resulted in the following error message: "This search ... has
been interrupted because it will return more than 1000 results." The mainstream political culture does not understand that school choice could be designed to promote
more centrist or liberal values. Just consider the features of choice presented below:
more spending, more government regulation, and targeted aid to the poor. These are
hardly typical conservative ideas. Unfortunately, the progressive school choice position
remains largely voiceless in the public debate as the Democratic Party remains beholden to the teachers' unions.
12. Moe, supra n. 4, at 301 ("[The modern progressive wing of the voucher movement] agree[s] that American society is fraught with inequities that can distort the operation of school choice, and that there are corresponding dangers to relying on free
markets. But they also believe that, with the right regulations, choice and competition
can greatly benefit poor and minority families and liberate them from a public school
system that is not serving their interests.") (citing John E. Coons & Stephen D.
Sugarman, Scholarships for Children (Inst. of Govtl. Stud. Press, U. of Cal., Berkeley
1992); John E. Coons & Stephen D. Sugarman, Education by Choice: The Case For
Family Control (U. of Cal., Berkeley 1978); Christopher Jencks, Education Vouchers: A
Report on Financing Education by Payments to Parents (Ctr. for the Study of Pub. Policy 1978); Christopher Jencks, Giving Parents Money to Pay for Schooling: Education
Vouchers, New Republic 19 (July 4, 1992)).
13. A flawed argument against school choice, discussed later, is that it violates
the separation of church and state by sending public tax dollars to private religious
schools. This concern is answered by carefully drafting the program. The school choice
funding process must put the decision clearly in the hands of the family. It should only
be through the choice of private individuals that public tax dollars go to religious organizations. As the case law below indicates, this solely private decision effectively in-
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supporters generally do not care that parents may choose to
have their children taught to read the Bible, the Koran, or the
Torah in school so long as the child graduates knowing how to
read.
B. This Paper
I begin this paper by describing the standard of an "adequate" education and explaining how public education systems
fail to provide an adequate education on an equal basis to children in poverty. Then, I address attempted reform plans including school finance reform, inter-district transfer, controlled
choice, magnet schools, and charter schools. The discussion of
reform plans concludes with an examination of school choice
systems implemented in Milwaukee and Cleveland. Next, I will
14
examine the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, focusing on
how it is a baby step in the right direction and how it highlights Congress's continued resistance to school choice systems.
Further, I identify legal and political barriers that frustrate the
implementation of broad school choice programs. The legal barriers I discuss are desegregation concerns and questions of
whether the inclusion of religious schools offends the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause. The political barriers I
discuss include partisan politics, the inability of citizens from
lower socio-economic backgrounds to exert any political power,
and strong opposition from civil rights groups and education
system policymakers. Finally, I propose a hypothetical broad
school choice program that can conquer legal and political barriers, that provides adequate education to poverty stricken students, and that will eventually reduce inequality between high
and low socio-economic classes and races.

II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EDUCATION

A What is an "Adequate" Education?
Dr. James M. Comer, Professor of Child Psychiatry at Yale
University, measures adequate education by determining
sulates the government from the appearance of endorsing religion. Such a system
would only violate the Establishment Clause as much as Social Security checks ending
up in collection plates.
14. H.R. Res. 1, 107th Cong. (2001).
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"whether students are having experiences that will help them
score adequately on tests and become responsible and disciplined in a way needed to be consistently successful in school
1
and in life." " Consequently, the adequacy of an education is
gauged by examining the results of standardized tests, such as
The College Board SAT Test Program (SAT) or the National
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), and by consider16
ing dropout rates and grade point averages.
Analysts compare schools in order to determine which
schools provide adequate educations for students. Between
schools in higher economic neighborhoods and schools in low
income neighborhoods, there exist many disparities in education. Frequently cited differences between the schools include
quality of books, access to computers, availability of laboratories, higher achievement standards, more qualified teachers,
smaller class sizes, and condition of school facilities. Results
from such comparisons evidence a correlation between adequacy of education and school funding. When children from a
particular socio-economic class consistently perform poorly on
tests and/or are consistently unsuccessful in school then one
may reasonably conclude that the "experiences" are not adequate. Conversely, when a school system churns out a large
number of good test scores and its students are successful in
school, then we reasonably may infer that the "experiences" are
adequate.

15. James P. Comer, Creating Successful Urban Schools, in Brookings Papers on
Education Policy: 1999, supra n. 1, at 331; see also Rose v. Council fi>r Better Educ.,
Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989). The majority opinion described what constitutes
an "efficient" education as required by the Kentucky state constitution:
An efficient system of education must have as its goal to provide each and every
child with at least the seven following capacities: (i) sufficient oral and written
communication skills to enable students to function in a complex and rapidly
changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to enable the student to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding
of governmental processes to enable the student to understand the issues that affect his or her community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and
knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in
the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her cultural and historical
heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either
academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose and pursue life
work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.
16. Daniel McGroarty, Break These Chains: The Battle For School Choice 23-24
(Prima Publishing 1996).
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The quality of the students' educational "experiences" depends on the financial resources of the school. More money
means better books, computers, laboratories, achievement
standards teacher qualifications, class sizes and condition of
11
facilities. Schools located in low socio-economic neighborhoods
have limited financial resources, and schools in high socioeconomic neighborhoods have expansive financial resources.
Consequently, policymakers measure education adequacy by
examining and noting differences in financial resources between schools.

B. The Unequal Distribution of Adequate Education
The disturbing correlation between adequacy of education
and financial resources particularly afflicts racial minorities in
urban areas. Studies indicate that a disproportionate number
of inadequate schools are located in urban areas. A disproportionate number of poor and minority children live in these urban neighborhoods. While only 24% of all American students
attend urban schools, 35% of the Boor and 43% of racial minori8
ties attend urban public schools. These studies illustrate the
fact that a disproportionate number of children in urban areas
are impoverished minorities. Roy Brooks, a law professor at the
University of San Diego aptly describes the impact of this phenomenon:
Despite the fact that African American students today are
more likely than any other racial or ethnic group to attend
public schools, this relationship has been an unkind one, not
unlike that of a badly abused child struggling to escape ubiquitous parental mistreatment, neglect, and violence, both
19
physical and psychological.

Despite attempts by courts to remedy racial discrimination,
the United States' public education system denies adequate
education to a majority of racial minorities in urban areas. Unfortunately, the vision of equal educational opportunity presented by cases like Brown v. Board of Education has not been
17. Linda Darling-Hammond, Race, Education, and Equal Opportunity, in The
African American Predicament, 71, 73-74 (Christopher H. Foreman, Jr. ed., Brookings
lnstn. Press 1999).
18. ,Joseph P. Viteritti, Choosing Equality: Sehoul Choice, The Constitution, and
Civil Society 7 (Brookings lnstn. Press 1999).
19. Roy L. Brooks, Rethinking the American Race Problem 74-75 (U. of Cal. Press
1990).
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20

realized. Racial minorities and the poor attend substandard,
21
urban, public schools at disproportionate rates. Although
overt racial segregation by law has been eliminated, children
from lower socio-economic backgrounds remain trapped in inadequate schools.
Many common-place features of urban public schools contribute to providing an inadequate education to students. First,
many urban schools are housed in old and poorly maintained
22
buildings, some dating back to the nineteenth century. Second, many of these ancient dilapidated buildings are oversized
23
and overcrowded. Third, inner-city children are also disproportionately likely to receive inexperienced teachers or teach24
ers who lack the requisite credentials. Given these conditions,
it is no surprise that "[r]ace and class remain the most reliable
25
predictors of educational achievement in the United States."
Numerous measures of school performance support the
statement that race and class are reliable predictors of educational achievement. A common way of measuring the effectiveness of a particular school or school system has been to gauge
the performance of their students by standardized tests. Arecent study found that only 40% of fourth and eighth grade students attending city schools met minimum basic standards on
national exams in reading, math, and science. In contrast,
20. See Brown u. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954) ("Here unlike Sweatt u.
Painter, there are findings that the Negro and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and
salaries of teachers, and other 'tangible' factors. Our decision, therefore, cannot turn
merely on a comparison of these tangible factors." This implies that equality in the
'tangible' factors is a necessary component of a system of equal educational equality
along with, as the court found in Brown, the absence of stigmatization caused by de
jure racial segregation.).
21. See Dale Davenport, Trapped by Mediocrity: Inner-city Schools Increasingly
Segregated, Beset by Poverty, The Patriot-News B15 (Harrisburg, Pa., July 22, 2001) (A
recent Harvard study found that black and Latino students are segregated in poor urban school districts while whites attend more affluent suburban schools, which attract
better teachers and more funding.)
22. Jean Anyon, Ghetto Schooling: A Political Economy of Urban Education Reform 7 (Teachers College Press 1997).
23. Peter D. Ross, Intradistrict Resource Disparities: A Problem Crying Out for a
Solution, in Strategies for School Equity: Creating Productive Schools in a Just Society
43 (Marilyn J. Gittell ed., Yale U. Press 1998).
24. !d. at 42 ("[The frequency of teachers lacking credentials] is the result of
many of the same factors that produce disparities in teacher experience in urban
schools: high turnover, inability to attract properly credentialed teachers, and the unwillingness of school districts to tackle the traditional prerogatives of seniority.").
25. Viteritti, supra n. 6, at 1.
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nearly two-thirds of students in suburban and rural districts
26
met these standards. Predictably, a clear disparity is also
found when the performance of various races is compared. Despite significant progress since the 1970's, the average African
American still scores below 75% of whites on almost every
27
standardized test.
The sad truth is that in the half century since Brown,
measurements based on available resources and pupil performance show that racial minorities still attend inferior
28
schools. While Brown's promise to realize racial equality
through educational opportunity has been slowed by our inept
29
and unjust school systems, many school reform programs
have been offered and implemented in recent years that could
help the nation's schools become the driving force toward racial
30
equa11ty.
0

Ill. SCHOOL REFORM EFFORTS

A. School Finance Reform

Arguably, the most important factor in providing a quality
education to the nation's students is adequate funding of the
public schools. School systems must be able to pay expenses
such as teacher and staff salaries, maintenance of facilities,
31
and classroom equipment and materials. Unfortunately, there
26. Id. at 7.
27. Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips, The Black-White Test Score Gap, in
The African American Predicament, supra n. 17, at 71, 73-74.
28. Viteritti, supra n. 6, at 11, 51 (citing Thomas J. Nechyba & Robert P. Strauss,
Community Choice and Local Public Services: A Discrete Choice Approach, 28 Regl. Sci.
& Urb. Econ. 51 (Jan. 1998); Margot Slade, First the Schoolhouse, Then the Home, N.Y.
Times sec. 11, page 1, col. 2 (Mar. 8, 1998)) (Because they are disproportionately represented among the poor, racial minorities are in effect denied the freedom to seek sanctuary from dreadfully inadequate inner-city schools by moving to more prosperous districts with better schools or sending their children to private schools. The inequality is
even more evident considering that the affluent and the majority of whites are able to
exercise the privilege to choose an effective education for their children by their ability
to move near better public schools or to afford private schools.).
29. Paul T. Hill & Mary Beth Celio, Fixing Urban Schools 4 (Brookings Instn.
Press 1998) ("Nearly half of all urban public school students are still giving up on
schooling before they can read and write well enough to make a living with anything
other than their hands.").
30. Viteritti, supra n. 6, at 27.
31. Kirk Vandersall, Post-Brown School Finance Reform, in Strategies for School
Equity: Creating Productive Schools in a Just Society, supra n. 23, at 11.
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a significant inequality in funding still exists between predominantly minority, urban school districts and predominantly
32
white, suburban school districts. A recent study found that
advantaged suburban school districts spend up to ten times
33
more than urban school districts.
The result of the gap in funding between urban and suburban school districts can be seen in the conditions under which
urban minorities are educated. Poor schools have bigger class
sizes, fewer course offerings, lower teacher qualifications, infe34
rior support services, and dilapidated facilities. Courts in
many states have recognized that a difference in funding available to districts results in a difference in educational resources
35
available for a child's education.
The financial inequality between suburban and urban
school districts is a result of the school funding schemes
adopted by each state. The prevailing trend is that most funds
36
for schools are raised from local property taxes. The combination of how school district boundaries are drawn and the phenomenon of "white flight" have isolated minorities who are
predominantly poor in concentrated impoverished districts. Because urban and poor people live in areas with lower property
37
values, the potential funds are quite limited. Justice Marshall
32. Alison Bernstein, Forward in Strategies for School Equity: Creating Productive Schools in a Just Society, supra n. 23, at viii.
33. Anyon, supra n. 22, at 7.
34. Thomas Corcoran & Nathan Scovronick, New Jersey's Quality Education Act,
in Strategies for School Equity: Creating Productive Schools in a Just Society, supra n.
23, at 56; Anyon, supra n. 22, at 7 ("[S]tudents in urban schools have only a 50%
chance of being taught by a certified mathematics or science teacher.").
35. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 86 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); see Campbell Co. Sch. Dist. v. St., 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995) (example
of a state case that has examined school funding systems that have, in practice, distributed funds among schools/districts in a widely disparate manner).
36. R. Craig Wood & David C. Thompson, Educational Finance Law: Constitutional Challenges to State Aid Plans -An Analysis of Strategies 16 (1996); see Paula J.
Lundberg, State Courts and School Funding: A Fifty-State Analysis, 63 Ala. L. Rev.
1101 (2000); Viteritti, supra n. 6, at 36.
37. Helen Hershkoff, School Finance Reform and the Alabama Experience, in
Strategies for School Equity: Creating Productive Schools in a Just Society, supra n. 23,
at 27 (Margaret E. Goertz of Rutgers University, testified in a recent Alabama case,
that Alabama's school finance system prevents poor school districts from having the
funds needed to provide basic educational opportunities and creates broad inter-district
disparities.); see also Corcoran & Scovronick, supra n. 34, at 55 (Many districts attempt
make up for this shortcoming by charging much higher property tax rates than suburban districts. However, these efforts still cannot match the wealth that the predominantly white, middle class districts can draw from. In New Jersey, "property-rich
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recognized the problem that such finance systems pose in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez: "The means
for financing public education ... are selected and specified by
the state. It is the state that has created local school districts,
and tied educational funding to the local property tax and
38
thereby to local district wealth."
Many states have recognized the disparities caused by their
39
school finance system, and several strategies have emerged to
respond to these inequalities. The least intrusive method used
focuses on the concept of adequacy. Rather than obligate states
to provide the poorest child the identical amount of per-pupil
funding that the child in the wealthiest district receives, the
concept of adequacy requires that states adopt school finance
systems that give every district the minimum level of funds
necessary to ensure that every child gets an adequate educa40
tion.
However, states have differed in defining what constitutes
41
an "adequate" education. In 1989, in Rose v. Council for Better
Education, Incorporated, the Kentucky Supreme Court outlined seven factors that every child must receive from an education.42 More recently, in Leandro v. State, the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that "[a]n education that does not serve
the purpose of preparing students to participate and compete
in the society in which they live and work is devoid of sub43
stance and is constitutionally inadequate." The application of
school district could raise more money per pupil with low tax rates than urban districts
could raise with very high rates. The real estate boom of the 1980s centered in the suburbs increased these disparities in tax capacity and spending.").
38. 411 U.S. at 123 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
39. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 624 So.2d 107 (Ala. 1993); MatanuskaSusitna Borough Sch. Dist. v. St., 931 P.2d 391 (Alaska 1997); Roosevelt Elementary
Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994); Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590
(Ariz. 1973); DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v.
Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976); Lujan u. Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982) (en
bane); Horton u. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. u. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1996); McDaniel u. Thomas,
285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981); Thompson u. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975); Comm.
for Educ. Rights u. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996); Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 u. St.,
885 P.2d 1170 (Kan. 1994); Rose, 790 S.W.2d 186; La. Assn of Educators u. Edwards,
521 S.2d 390 (La. 1988).
40. Viteritti, supra n. 6, at 39-40.
41. ld.
42. 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (see supra note 15 for a list of the Kentucky Supreme
Court's factors composing an adequate education).
43. 488 S.E.2d 249, 254-55 (N.C. 1997). The court further held that:
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an adequacy strategy is easier said than done especially because the measurement of adequacy is often tied to educational
44
outcomes across several vague categories of achievement.
A more controversial approach of school finance reform involves the redistribution of funds by the state among the vari45
ous school districts.
This politically unpopular strategy
changes the system so that funds are collected from property
taxes and distributed equally among the schools regardless of
district lines. This decreases spending in the richer districts
46
and redirects the funds to the poorer districts. As a consequence, such a strategy is unlikely to be adopted by a politically-charged legislature that is responsive to a more affluent
population ofvoters and special interests.
The final common strategy of school finance reform is to attack the constitutionality of the state's school finance system.
Since Rodriguez, the federal courts have maintained that the
Federal Constitution does not guarantee a fundamental right
to education and have subjected claims of inequality to the
Equal Protection Clause standard of whether the state action
47
rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or interest. This
"rational basis" standard is deferential to the state legislatures

Article I, Section 15 and Article IX, Section 2 of the North Carolina Constitution
combine to guarantee every child of this state an opportunity to receive a sound
basic education in our public schools. For purposes of our Constitution, a "sound
basic education" is one that will provide the student with at least: (1) sufficient
ability to read, write, and speak the English language and a sufficient knowledge
of fundamental mathematics and physical science to enable the student to function
in a complex and rapidly changing society; (2) sufficient fundamental knowledge of
geography, history, and basiceconomic and political systems to enable the student
to make informed choices with regard to issues that affect the student personally
or affect the student's community, state, and nation; (3) sufficient academic and
vocational skills to enable the student to successfully engage in post-secondary
education or vocational training; and (4) sufficient academic and vocational skills
to enable the student to compete on an equal basis with others in further formal
education or gainful employment in contemporary society.
44. Id. at 255.
45. Vandersall, supra n. 31, at 19 (citing Rose, 790 S.W.2d 186) (In ruling the
state's school finance system unconstitutional, a Kentucky court "ordered the General
Assembly to devise an altogether new system in which the tax effort was evenly
spread, uniform resources necessary for providing an adequate education provided, and
proper management was assured.").
46. Id. at 39.
47. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 41; see e.g. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220-21 (1982);
Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419 (7'" Cir. 1997); Pontarelli Limousine, Inc, v. Chi., 929
F.2d 339 (7th Cir. 1991); Craig v. Selma City Sch. Bd., 801 F. Supp. 585, 594 (S. D. Ala.
1982); Fuller v. Decatur Pub. Sch. Bd., 78 F.Supp.2d. 812, 822 (C. D. Ill. 2000).
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and is difficult to overcome. Reform advocates have had better
luck litigating ine~uities in funding under the provisions of
state constitutions.
Inequalii;X in school funding has led to lawsuits in over
forty states. · The history of school-finance litigation has commonly been divided into three "waves." The first wave based
claims of inequality in funding on the Equal Protection Clause
of the Federal Constitution. This wave ended with the Supreme
50
Court's decision in Rodriguez. The second wave relied upon
equal protection provisions in the state constitutions to enforce
51
equality of funding between rich and poor districts. During
this Reriod, seven states overturned their school funding systems.52 However, the vast majority of the cases upheld the
53
funding systems in favor of the state. Finally, the current
wave has focused on the specific right to an education provided
5
in 49 state constitutions. This wave focuses on the differences
in educational quality resulting from a disparate educational
finance system rather than an analysis centered only on unequal funding. This wave takes into account the inequality of
55
education in a district that has invested substantial funding.

48. Strategies for School Equity: Creating Productive Schools in a Just Society,
supra n. 23, app. To Part I, 70-83.
49. Kelly Thompson Cochran, Comment, Beyond School Financing: Defining the
Constitutional Right to an Adequate Education, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 399, 400 (2000).
50. Deborah A. Verstegen & Robert C. Knoeppel, Equal Education Under the
Law: School Finance Reform and the Courts, 14 J.L. & PoL 555, 557 (1998).
51. Id.; William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Waue of School Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. Rev. 597, 601-03
(1994).
52. Thro, supra n. 51, at 603; see e.g. Dupree, 651 S.W.2d 90; Serrano, 557 P.2d
929; Horton, 376 A.2d 359; Robinson u. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1 u. St., 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978) (en bane); Pauley u. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859
(W.Va. 1979); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 u. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980).
53. Thro, supra n. 51, at 603; see e.g. Dupree, 651 S.W.2d 90; Serrano, 557 P.2d
929; Lujan, 649 P.2d 1005; Horton, 376 A.2d 359; McDaniel, 285 S.E.2d 156; Thompson, 537 P.2d 635; Hornbeck v. Somerset County Ed. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983);
Britt u. Ed. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432 (N.C.), affd mem., 361 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1987); Robinson, 303 A.2d 273; Ed. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982); Ed. of Educ.
u. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979); Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. u. St., 746
P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); Olsen u. St., 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 1976); Danson u. Casey, 399
A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979); Richland County u. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988); Seattle
Sch. !Jist. No. 1, 585 P.2d 71; Pauley, 255 S.E.2d 859;Kukor u. Grauer, 436 N.W.2d 568
(Wis. 1989); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 606 P.2d 310.
54. Thro, supra n. 51, at 602, n. 29, 603 (Mississippi is the only state without an
education clause that requires the states to maintain a free educational system.).
55. ld.
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During this third wave of school finance reform litigation,
state educational funding systems have been invalidated in
56
eleven states. For example, the Supreme Court of Wyoming,
in Campbell County School District v. State, found that the
education funding system violated the Wyoming Constitution
based on the principle that substantially unequal allocation of
7
funds leads to an uneven distribution of quality education. 5 At
the time of the decision, the Wyoming funding plan created a
58
per-student disparity ranging from $1,600 to $4,300. The
plaintiffs argued that the spending disparities were caused by
"the arbitrary and irrational devices employed in distribution"
that have no relation to educational costs. The plaintiffs
claimed that the allocation of funding should be based on "need
59
related to educational quality." In finding the state's educational finance system unconstitutional, the majority opinion
concluded by instructing the legislature how to create a system
that would pass constitutional muster:
[C]onsidering all of these various factors, the legislature must
first design the best educational system by identifying the
"proper" educational package each Wyoming student is enti-·
tled to have whether she lives in Laramie or in Sundance. The
cost of that educational package must then be determined and
the legislature must then take the necessary action to fund
that package .... The state financed basket of quality educational goods and services available to all school-age youth
must be nearly identical from district to district. If a local district then wants to enhance the content of that basket, the
legislature can provide a mechanism by which it can be done.
But first, before all else, the constitutional basket must be
60
filled.

56. See Roosevelt Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 66, 877 P.2d 806; Rose., 790 S.W.2d 186;
McDuffy v. Sec. of Exec. Off of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Helena Elementary
Sch. Dist. No.1 v. St., 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Gov., 703 A.2d
1353 (N.H. 1997); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); DeRolph v. St., 677 N.E.2d
733 (Ohio 1997); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993);
Brigham v. St., 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997); Campbell Co. Sch. Dist., 907 P.2d 1238; Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 893 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1995); Carrollton-Farmers
Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992);
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
57. Campbell Co. Sch. Dist., 907 P.2d at 1263.
58. Verstegen & Knoeppel, supra n. 50, at 561.
59. Campbell Co. Sch. Dist., 907 P.2d at 1263.
60. ld. at 1279-80.
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The decision in Campbell County School District shows how
the reasoning supporting school finance reform has shifted
from comparing dollars distributed to comparing what those
dollars have produced in the form of educational quality.
While there have been some indications of positive results,
a strategy of generating equal educational opportunities
through school finance reform has several disadvantages. First,
it is difficult to construct a school finance formula that "enhances the equity of the system while meeting the fiscal and
61
political needs of the state." Citizens in wealthier districts are
not likely to support bills to either cap their educational spending or redistribute their funds. On the other hand, a state's effort to keep pace with the spending of the wealthy districts will
62
end up burdening the state's resources to dangerous levels.
Seeking more federal aid to supplement state funding has its
own disadvantage. A federalism issue is raised when Congress
is able to attach terms on its funds that would allow it to im63
pose its will on the local districts.
Secondly, much of the research shows that there is no consistent relationship between education spending and student
64
achievement. This problem resides in how poor and urban
school districts spend the additional funds once they are
granted. It may be that a significant amount of the money is
not being properly devoted to educational resources that di65
rectly affect the education of the students. For example, mismanagement of education funds was recently a major concern
in the Washington, D.C., school system. By 1997, the D.C. public school system was allotted $594 million dollars per year -

61. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 71(Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Margaret E. Goertz, The Courts and Reform in New Jersey, in Strategies for School Equity: Creating Productive Schools in a Just Society, supra n. 23, at
111.
62. See Goertz, supra n. 61, at 111; Viteritti, supra n. 6, at 35-36.
63. Viteritti, supra n. 6, at 36.
64. !d. at 42 (citing Eric Hanushek, Assessing the Effects of School Resources on
Student Performance: An Update, 19 Educ. Evaluation & Policy Analysis 141, 141
(Summer 1997)); see also James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 432, 435-36 (1999).
65. ld. ("Large urban districts are notorious for wasting resources on overhead
and administrative functions, while classrooms are denied basic materials such as
textbooks, and school buildings rot in disrepair.... Settlements that award these districts with more money resemble a reckless driving case where the court offers compensation for the driver to purchase a bigger car, rather than address the losses of the
injured party.")
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about $7,389 per student- and still found itselflacking books,
toilet paper, building repairs, and teachers. A Washington Post
report found that from 1990 to 1995 the D.C. schools spent $50
million more on personnel than they were authorized to by the
D.C. Council and Congress. The report found that of the
amount spent on personnel, the city spent a disproportionately
high ~roportion on central administrators compared to other
cities. ·s This is but one example of how spending additional
funds may not necessarily lead to increases in the quality of
67
education provided. While a strategy of school finance reform
certainly recognizes the obvious inequality in educational opportunity between poor urban districts and wealthy suburban
districts, the problem appears to be too complex for such a simple and politically-difficult solution as equalizing funding.
B. Reform Plans Involving Forms of School Choice

The school reform plans involving school choice show the
most promise for providing racial minorities and the poor with
an equal educational opportunity. The common theme of these
strategies is that parents are given the option to remove their
children from ineffective schools. This essentially guarantees a
privilege to poorer Americans a privilege that is taken for
granted by affluent, predominantly white citizens: the ability to
send their children to private or parochial schools or at least to
68
move their residence to a district with better public schools.
These choice proposals seek to grant this freedom to the impoverished citizens who are predominantly members of a racial
minority.

66. Sari Horwitz & Valerie Strauss, A Well-Financed Failure: System Protects
Jobs While Shortchanging Classrooms, Wash. Post, Al (February 16, 1997) (In recent
years the D.C. schools had an average of sixteen teachers per central administrator
compared to Los Angeles with 60 teachers per central administrator. Between 1979
and 1992 the number of students attending D.C. public schools decreased from 113,000
to 33,000; while the number of central office workers increased from 511 to 967.).
67. Frederick M. Hess, Courting Backlash: The Risks of Emphasizing Input Equity Over School Performance, 6 Va. J. Soc. Policy & L. 11, 24-25 (1998); ); Anyon, supra n. 22, at 6-7; Ernest G. Kelly, Jr., School Finance Litigation: An Urban Perspective,
61 Tenn. L. Rev. 471, 472 (1994).
68. Viteritti, supra n. 6, at 11 ("Most Americans have the economic wherewithal
to live in or move to communities where the schools are at least adequate, and quite a
large number have the means to afford private or religious schools that reflect their
own values. The poor do not have ready access to the same kinds of institutions.").
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1. Inter-district Transfer Plans and Controlled Choice

State and local governments widely used school-transfer
policies following the desegregation mandate of Brown. States
also implemented minority-majority transfer policies to pursue
69
their desegregation goals. A notable inter-district transfer
program was implemented in St. Louis. Beginning in 1983, urban residents could choose to attend any of the 120 suburban
schools in St. Louis County. Thirteen thousand five hundred
black students took advantage of this program which provided
free transportation and prohibited the suburban district from
turning away transfer students based on past academic performance.70 Similarly, Minnesota, in 1985, adopted a plan that
allowed at-risk students, in need of remedial instruction, to
71
cross district lines and attend any school with vacancy. 8,500
students exercised this option by 1995. Seventeen states have
72
implemented similar plans since 1987. However, despite the
successes of these voluntary inter-district transfer plans, critics
note that leaving such discretion to parents hindered the pro73
gression of integration in public schools.
In response to the desegregation concerns, school districts
developed a controlled-choice program. Under a controlledchoice program, if certain standards of racial balance are not
met the administration will assign students to a particular
74
school regardless of the students' wishes. The Cambridge,
Massachusetts, school system was the first district to adopt a
controlled-choice plan. Cambridge removed assignment zones,
allowed families to rank their preferences for which school they
wanted their children to attend, and retained the possibility of

69. Keyes u. Sch. Dist. No. I, 413 U.S. 189, 241 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) ("An
optional majority-to-minority transfer program, with the State providing free transportation to desiring students, is also a helpful adjunct to a desegregated school system.").
70. Amy Stuart Wells, African American Students' View of School Choice, in Who
Chooses? Who Loses?: Culture, Institutions, and the Unequal Effects of School Choice 29
(Bruce Fuller & Richard F. Elmore, eds., Teachers College Press 1996).
71. Viteritti, supra n. 6, at 62 (citing Amy Stuart Wells, Time to Choose: America
at the Crossroads of" School Choice Policy 96-128 (Hill and Wang 1993); Tim Mazzoni &
Barry Sullivan, Legislating Educational Choice in Minnesota: Politics and Prospects, in
Choice in Education: Potential and Problems (William L. Boyd & Herbert Walberg eds.,
McCutchan 1990)).
72. Id. at 62-63.
73. I d. at 58 (citing Christine H. Rossell & David Armor, The Effectiveness of Desegregation Plans: 1968-1991, 24 Am. Pol. Q. 267 (July 1996)).
74. ld.
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mandatory assignments in schools lacking racial balance. Although controlled-choice plans did have positive effects, some
programs could not deal with the large increase in transportation costs and parents' general preference for local, neighbor76
hood schools.
2. Magnet Schools
Magnet schools are another innovation created to foster integration and school choice. Magnet schools offer a distinct curriculum, theme, or method of teaching designed to attract students away from their neighborhood schools. Frequently,
districts create magnet schools as part of a court order to en77
force desegregation. Magnet schools subject to a court order
are often required to maintain certain racial quotas. Districts
placed magnet schools in predominantly minority districts to
78
attract white students or vice-versa. However, some students
requesting a transfer are denied admittance because they
79
would upset that particular district's racial balance.
A common concern over magnet schools is that the desegregation focus takes resources from other urban public schools.
School districts devote large amounts of money to attract white
students to the innovative programs and facilities of a magnet
75. Viteritti, supra n. 6, at 58 (citing Peter W. Cookson, School Choice: The Struggle for the Soul of American Education (Yale U. Press 1994); Christine H. Rossell &
Charles Glenn, The Cambridge Controlled Choice Plans, 20 Urb. Rev. 75 (1988)).
76. !d. at 59 (citing Christine H. Rossell, The Convergence of Black and White Attitudes on School Desegregation Issues During the Four Decade Evolution of the Plans,
36 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 613 (1995); Amy Stuart Wells, supra n. 71, at 91) (The Richmond, California school district went bankrupt from the increased transportation and
specialized programs cost. "[M]ost parents seek to avoid extensive travel unless there is
an extraordinary academic benefit derived in the form of a magnet or specialized program.").
77. Kimberly C. West, A Desegregation Tool that Backfired: Magnet School and
Classroom Segregation, 103 Yale L.J. 2567, 2568-69 (1994) ("Courts order the creation
of magnet schools and districts implement them because magnet schools are perceived
as capable of furthering the dual goals of desegregation and educational innovation.").
78. Susan E. Eaton & Elizabeth Crutcher, Magnets, Media, and Mirages: Prince
George's County's "Miracle" Cure, in Dismantling Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal o{
Brown v. Board of Education 269 (Gary Orfield & Susan E. Eaton eds., New Press
1996).
79. Jeffrey R. Henig, The Local Dynamics of Choice: Ethnic Preferences and Institutional Responses, in Who Chooses? Who Loses?: Culture, Institutions, and the Unequal Effects of School Choice, supra n. 58, at 114 ("Because minority transfer requests
were more likely to run counter to than support racial balance, school officials found
themselves forced to deny a higher proportion of requests from minorities than from
majorities.").
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school. Instead, the districts could use the same money to raise
the quality of education of all students. For example, Kansas
City spent $1.4 billion on its magnet school plan. However,
seven years after its implementation, Kansas City school districts still lagged behind the statewide scores on standardized
tests_Ho
3. Charter Schools
81

Charter school is another option available to parents.
Charter schools are a compromise position between choice advocates and supporters of the current academic structure. The
public education establishment finds charter schools acceptable
because they differ from radical voucher systems. Unlike
voucher schools, access to charter schools is open and no tuition
is charged. Choice advocates endorse charter schools because
they provide other options for parents and competition for pub82
lic schools.
A group can create a charter school when the state or local
governing body grants permission (through a charter) for the
group to create a new school (or convert an old one) that will
run nearly independent of the state. Charter schools are run at
the school level where school personnel have wide discretion in
budget, personnel, and school policies. In exchange for this
freedom, the charter school faces a higher level of accountability as they must meet certain academic and financial standards
83
set for them by the state. Charter schools that fail to meet

80. Robin D. Barnes, Black America and School Choice: Chartering a New Course,
106 Yale L.J. 2375, 2402 (1997).
81. Thomas L. Good & Jennifer S. Braden, The Great School Debate: Choice,
Vouchers, and Charters 119 (L. Erlbaum Assoc. 2000) (citing Bruno Manno, Accountability:
The
Key
to
Charter
Renewal,
<http://edreform.com/pubs/center_for_education_reform.htm> (accessed March 1999)
(A charter school is "[a]n independent public school of choice, given a charter or contract for a specified period of time (typically five years) to educate children according to
the schools own design, with a minimum of bureaucratic oversight. It may be a new
school, started from scratch, or an existing one that secedes from its school district. It
is held accountable to the terms of its charter and continues to exist only if it fulfills
those terms. As a public school of choice, it is attended by students whose families select it and staffed by educators who choose to teach in it.").
82. Bryan C. Hassel, The Case For Charter Schools, in Learning From School
Choice 33, 34-35 (Paul E. Peterson & Bryan C. Hassel eds., Brookings Instn. Press
1998).
83. See Viteritti, supra n. 6, at 65 (citing Joe Nathan, Charter Schools: Creating
Hope and Opportunity for American Education (Jossey Bass 1996)) (Charters are released from all regulations except those concerning civil rights, health, and safety);
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these standards are shut down. As of 1999, there were about
85
1,400 charter schools in operation across the nation.
The funding of charter schools is provided directly by the
public school system. The money allocated to charter schools is
tied to enrollment- the more students a charter school attracts
the more funds it receives. This induces schools to develop and
maintain high levels of student performance and innovative
86
programs in order to remain in operation.
However, charter school programs come in numerous forms.
Each state that authorizes charter schools has its own distinct
system of creating and running charter schools. For example,
Arizona's charter law is designed in a way that favors the creation of a large number of charter schools that effectively compete with the traditional public schools. In Arizona, a charter
school can be established by any organization or group. The
charter school can be new or converted from an established
public or private school. The initial charter is granted for a
term of 15 years and is subject to reviews every five years
thereafter. Arizona charter schools are granted a waiver from
state and local education laws and regulations exce~t for those
7
that govern health, safety, and special education. Arizona's
law does not require that teachers in charter schools receive
certification by the local board of education. Finally, all stu88
dents in the state are eligible to attend the charter schools.
This strong charter law has led Arizona to develop the most

Breaking Away: The Charter School Revolution, 15 Education Week (Special Report,
November 29, 1995); Hassel, supra n. 82, at 35.
84. Hassel, supra n. 82, at 36-37 ("If a charter school fails to deliver on its promises (perhaps regarding absolute levels or improvements in student achievement
scores, dropout rates, college attendance, and so on), the relevant public authority can
revoke its charter. In the current lingo, the school is 'accountable for results'-not just
to parents, but to the public as well.").
85. Good & Braden, supra n. 81, at 114.
86. Hassel, supra n. 82, at 35.
87. Paul E. Peterson, Top Ten Questions Asked About School Choice in Brookings
Papers on Education Policy: 1999, supra n. 1, at 371, 372; Good & Braden, supra n. 81,
at 130-31.
88. Good & Braden, supra n. 81, at 130-31; David Harmer, School Choice: Why
You Need It- How You Get It 107 (1994) (Qualified professionals with expertise in the
subject being taught are denied teaching positions because they lack certification held
by current teachers who may have little knowledge of the subject they are teaching. "In
California, for example, highly qualified aerospace engineers are unemployed because
of defense industry layoffs. Many would make good math and science teachers, which
the state desperately needs. It makes no sense to bar them from the classroom simply
because they lack a state credential.").
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prolific charter school system in the nation with a total of 408
charter schools enrolling 55,000 students for the 2000-01 school
89
year.
However, the Arizona charter school law is far from typical
of those passed by other states. In most cases, the legislative
compromise necessary just to get the charter law passed causes
it to be enacted with provisions that undermine its ability to
provide abundant choice for parents and competition for public
90
schools. Generally, in passing charter laws, legislators have
done the following three things: 1) placed limits on the number
91
of charter schools that can be opened; 2) allocated to charter
schools a portion of the per-pupil funding allocation used to
92
educate that same student in a regular public school; and 3)
have given local school boards the power to decide whether a
93
charter is granted.
Given the novelty of the charter school concept, and that it
has been implemented in relatively limited instances and in
various fashions, the conclusions that can be drawn from the
94
resulting data are imperfect. However, this caveat has not
prevented the ensuing discussion of results reported from initial studies. The general trend among the studies is that students attending charter schools show as much academic improvement as do students in regular public schools. However,
many studies note that when schools are compared on an individual level, some charter schools showed higher results than
95
public schools in the same district. This result reminds us
that charter schools are each unique; there really is no such

89. Kelly Pearce, Arizona's Charter Schools Evolving Into Mainstream: No Longer
Cater to Niche Students, The Arizona Republic B1 (August 19, 2000).
90. Bryan C. Hassel, Charter Schools: Politics and Practice in Four States, in
Learning From School Choice, supra n. 82, at 249, 257-58.
91. Id. at 259.
92. Viteritti, supra n. 6, at 75 ("Under the typical law, the charter school is entitled only to a portion of the per-pupil local operating expenditures and is rarely given
resources to cover capital costs."); Hassell, supra n. 84, at 259 (Only nine states give
charter schools full per-pupil operating funding.).
93. Hassell, supra n. 84, at 258-59 (Only Arizona, Colorado, Michigan, and New
Jersey have charter school laws that allow many charter schools to open and allow entities other than local school boards to approve charters.).
94. Good & Braden, supra n. 81, at 138 ("First, charter schools differ from state to
state, and variation within a state can be tremendous. Second, defining the impact of
charter schools is difficult, because only a few studies have been conducted, and generally, charter school research has not benefited from the advantages of peer review.").
95. Id. at 154-55.
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thing as a "charter school system." A major principle of the
charter school concept is to allow parents the choice of sending
their child to a specific school that they believe is more successful than the public school that their child would otherwise attend. Research evaluating charter schools should be designed
to determine whether a specific charter school is more effective
than public schools in the same district rather than draw conclusions from the aggregation of all charter schools in the state.
Regarding charter school evaluation, it is probably not true
that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

4. School Choice Systems in Milwaukee and Cleveland
The most notable experiments with a system of school
choice occurred during the 1990's in Milwaukee, Wisconsin and
Cleveland, Ohio. These plans, while not full choice systems, illustrate the potential benefits of an educational system built
around parental choice. They also show the strength of the opposition to choice-based reforms and the problem of collecting
accurate measures of the effectiveness of the programs.

i. The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program
In 1993, the Wisconsin legislature enacted the original
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) that, after a 1993
amendment, allowed students below a certain poverty level to
attend any private, non-sectarian school within the City of
Milwaukee. The legislature limited the number of students
who could participate in MPCP to 1.5 percent of the student
9
body of the Milwaukee Public Schools. To be eligible for the
MPCP, a student had to be in grades K-12, belong to a family
whose income did not exceed 1. 75 times the federal poverty
level, and "... either enrolled in a public school in Milwaukee,
attending a private school under this program, or not enrolled
97
in school during the previous year." The legislation also required private schools participating in the MPCP to comply
with anti-discrimination regulations, health and safety regula98
tions, and to meet certain performance criteria.

96. Jackson u. Benson, 578 N.W. 2d 602, 607 (1998) (citing Wis. Stat. §119.23
(1993-94)).
97. !d. at 608.
98. !d.
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In 1995, the MPCP was amended again by the Wisconsin
legislature. The amendment expanded the program to include
99
sectarian schools as options for school choice. The legislature
also increased the number of students the program could accept to 15 percent of the Milwaukee Public School student
body. The amendment, to withstand state and federal constitutional scrutiny, required the state to submit the tuition payment to the student's parents who would then turn the money
100
over to the school of their choice.
The amendment also included an "opt-out" that allows a student to opt out of religious
101
activities held at religious schools.
While the Milwaukee program provides many students with
an adequate education, it has several limitations that exclude
it from being a good model of a full-school choice system. Therefore, analysis of the data provided by the Milwaukee system
provides, at best, a skewed evaluation of the effectiveness of a
102
school choice system. Various studies relying on this same
data have reached different conclusions. A group of researchers
led by John Witte was appointed by Wisconsin State Superintendent Herbert Grover, a well-known opponent of school
103
choice, to conduct the state's official evaluation of the MPCP.
Witte led a five-year study of MPCP that ultimately found that
"[s]tatistical analyses generally indicated that choice and public school students were not that much different. If there was a
difference, [Milwaukee Public School] students did somewhat
. rea d'mg. ,104
b e tt er m
99. !d.
100. !d. at 608-09.
101. !d. (citing 1995 Wis. Act 27, §§ 4002-4009).
102. Jay P. Greene, Paul E. Peterson & Jiangtao Du, School Choice in Milwaukee:
A Randomized Experiment, in Learning From School Choice, supra n. 82, at 335, 339;
Good & Braden, supra n. 81, at 106 (The Milwaukee program recently has become in
danger of being scaled back by the Wisconsin legislature.); Ruben Navarrette, Jr.,
Children: Choices & Lessons, Milwaukee J. Sentinel 01J (June 24, 2001); School
Vouchers Are the Clear Choice, Wis. St. J. A6 (June 20, 2001)("Milwaukee's school
choice program has never been a favorite of Democratic Party leaders in Madison, so
it's no surprise they want to starve the private voucher program into an early grave.
Senate Democrats aspire to cut individual grants in half, cap the number of students
and require more accountability through student testing.").
103. Viteritti, supra n. 6, at 101, 105.
104. Good & Braden, supra n. 81, at 105 (citing John Witte, Troy D. Sterr, Christopher A. Thorn, Fifth-Year Report: Milwaukee Parental Choice Program,
<http://www.lafollette. wisc.ed u/researchlpublications/fifthYear/fifthYear.html> (Dept.
of Pol. Sci. & The M. LaFollette Inst. of Pub. Affairs, U. of Wis. Madison Dec. 1995).
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A study headed by Jay Greene and Paul Peterson found
that "data derived from a natural experiment that allocated
students randomly to test and control groups suggest that students in choice schools in their third and fourth years scored on
average from three to five percentile points higher in mathe105
matics than a randomly selected control group." Greene and
Peterson's research identified a flaw in the methodology of the
Witte study. Witte's analysis compared students in choice
schools with a randomly selected control group of students in
Milwaukee city schools. This comparison is flawed because the
groups are composed of different populations regarding important characteristics such as race, income, family structure, and
106
past educational performance.
Unfortunately, the MPCP
provides no dependable research evidence to conclude that a
broad system of school choice impacts favorably on student
107
achievement.

ii. The Cleveland Grant Program
In 1995, the Ohio General Assembly enacted the Cleveland
Scholarship and Tutoring Grant Program (CSTGP). The
CSTGP provided 1,500 scholarships chosen on a lottery basis
108
that covered up to 90 percent of a child's tuition.
The program partially favored poor families because the amount of the
scholarship depended on family income, and the first year's lot109
tery was only open to families below the poverty line.
The

105. !d. at 106.
106. Viteritti, supra n. 6, at 106 (citing Bob Davis, Dueling Professors Have Milwaukee Dazed over School Vouchers, The Wall St. J. (Oct. 11, 1996); Paul E. Peterson,
A Critique of the Witte Evaluation of Milwaukee's School Choice Program (Ctr. for Am.
Pol. Stud., Har. U., Occasional Paper 95-2 Feb. 1995) (Differences included: "72 percent
of the choice students were black, compared to 55 percent of the MPS control group; 20
percent of the choice students were Latino, compared to 10 percent of the MPS control
group .... Choice students reported family incomes of about half the average [MPS]
family ... 24 percent of the choice students came from two-parent households, as compared to 51 percent of [MPS] students; 57 percent [of choice students] were on public
assistance, compared to 39 percent [ofMPS students].").
107. Good & Braden, supra n. 81, at 106.
108. Jay P. Greene, William G. Howell, & Paul E. Peterson, Lessons From the
Cleveland Scholarship Program, in Learning from School Choice, supra n. 82, at 357,
358-359.
109. Viteritti, supra n. 6, at 110; Greene. Howell & Peterson, supra n. 108, at 359;
see Margaret A. Nero, Comment, The Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program:
Why Voucher Programs Do Not Violate the Establishment Clause, 58 Ohio St. L.J. 1103,
1107-1110 (1997).
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CSTGP granted scholarships to children in kindergarten
through third grade but permitted students to retain the schol110
arship through the eighth grade.
Students could use their
scholarship at any secular, religious, or private school within
the city.m It also gave tutoring scholarships for those students
112
who chose to remain in Cleveland's public schools.
The CSTGP was the first program in the nation that allowed students to choose to spend government-granted funds at
113
a religious school. Predictably, litigation alleging violation of
the Establishment Clause soon followed. However, the Ohio
114
Supreme Court held the CSTGP to be constitutional.
The
litigation then went to federal court where District Judge
Solomon Oliver found that the CSTGP violated the Establishment Clause and enjoined the state from administering the
program.m The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
116
Circuit affirmed the district court finding on appeal.
By
granting a stay of the injunction pending the outcome of its decision, the United States Supreme Court allowed the CSTGP to
117
continue.
Kim Metcalf of the Indiana University School of Education
led a team that conducted an official state study of CSTGP one
118
year into its inception. The study focused on the effects of the
program on 183 third-graders who used vouchers to attend private schools during the 1996-97 school year and who attended
public schools during the previous year. The study found that
"students' academic achievement was not significantly affected
llO. Nero, supra n. 109, at 1108.
lll. Greene, Howell & Peterson, supra n. 108, at 358.
ll2. Nero, supra n. 109, at ll08.
ll3. Greene, Howell & Peterson, supra n. 108, at 358.
ll4. See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999).
115. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834, 865 (N. D. Ohio 1999) affd
234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. granted Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 23
(2001) and cert. granted Hanna Perkins Sch. v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 23 (2001)
and cert. granted Taylor v. Simmons-Harris 122 S. Ct. 23 (2001) ("Because of the overwhelmingly large number of religious versus nonreligious schools participating in the
Voucher Program, beneficiaries cannot make a genuine, independent choice of what
school to attend. A program that is so skewed toward religion necessarily results in indoctrination attributable to the government and provides financial incentives to attend
religious schools. For both of these reasons, the court finds the Program to be in violation of the Establishment Clause.").
ll6. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000).
ll7. See Kim Cobb, School Vouchers Continue in Ohio Amid Uncertainty, Houston
Chron. A10 (Mar. 25, 2001).
ll8. Good & Braden, supra n. 81, at 107.
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after approximately eight months in the scholarship program."119
This study of the CSTGP, like the study of the Milwaukee
program, cannot translate into a reliable extrapolation of the
capabilities of a complete school choice system. As was the case
in Milwaukee, the sample size was too small to produce reliable
conclusions. Of the 183 students the researchers studied, com120
plete data was available for only 94 students. Furthermore,
the study's authors cautioned against drawing suitable conclusions about school choice from this stud~ because of the short
21
time period and limited data examined. And, it may be unreasonable to expect significant change in just eight months
from a child who received an inadequate early education.
The research experiences in Milwaukee and Cleveland
show the difficulty in drawing conclusions about the potential
of a full school choice plan from an evaluation of local-choice
experiments. Thomas Good and Jennifer Braden emphasized
this problem of testing the theory of school choice, stating:
"Across both the Milwaukee and Cleveland choice programs we
see that inadequate research design and incomplete data sets
have rendered comparisons of student performance in choice
122
and non-choice schools difficult to interpret." The evidence of

119. Kim K. Metcalf, William J. Boone, Frances K. Stage, Todd L. Chilton, Patty S.
Muller, & Polly Tait, An Executive Summary of a Comparative Evaluation of the Cleve·
land Scholarship
and
Tutoring Grant Program:
Year
One:
1996-97
<http://www.aft.org/research!Vouchers/clev/metcalf!Metcalf.htm> (Am. Fedn. Of
Teachers, AFL-CIO March 16, 1998).
120. Id. (The executive summary noted the small size of the sample group: "ODE
records were updated to reveal that, only 45 of the students who had been believed to
be participating in the tutoring grant program or on the waiting list to participate in
tutoring were doing so. Due to the small number of students in this group and difficulty locating CCSD background and prior achievement records for many of these students, it was decided that the tutoring grant program should not be included in the
present analyses. Further, 37 of the 183 public-private scholarship students attended
the HOPE schools which did not participate in the evaluation testing (see data collection), and necessary background data could not be located on another 52 students.
Thus, the final sample includes third-grade students for whom all necessary data (i.e,
current achievement test scores, previous achievement test scores, and background
data) were available: 94 public-private scholarship students and 449 non-participating
Cleveland public school students.").
121. Good & Braden, supra n. 81, at 107.
122. Id. at 109 (Good and Braden continue: "However, it is useful to remind readers at this point that the voucher movement, like other reform movements (open classrooms, new math, etc.) is a large and vague concept under whose umbrella many variations operate. It is time to stop comparing only voucher and non-voucher schools and to
examine high- and low-performing schools within each group.").
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the effectiveness of a broad choice system, as drawn from lim123
ited local choice experiments, is inconclusive. Therefore, substantial supporting evidence of the success of a broad choice
program is not available.
C. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001
When the current federal education reform legislation was
124
proposed, it contained a broad school-choice experiment.
However, the initial promise of the plan has been deflated be125
cause of significant changes. The Act does make some progress in its breadth of ideas and in real accountability. The
plan significantly increases funding, standardizing testing requirements, establishes some consequences for consistently
failing schools, and provides opportunities for students in these
failing schools. Interestingly, meaningful school choice is missing from this Act. Despite this, the No Child Left Behind Act
makes some progress in breadth of ideas, if not real accountability.
1. Annual Testing and Accountability
The most progressive part of the recent education legislation is the standardized testing mandate. The Act requires
states to develop and administer yearly tests in reading and
126
math to students in grades three through eight.
It requires
123. Id.
124. On January 8, 2002, President George W. Bush signed the No Child Left Behind Act. The 1,200-page Act was the result of broad bipartisan compromise balancing
Democratic demands for increased funding with Republican demands of accountability.
See Mike Bowler, Hope for Best in 1,200 Pages, Baltimore Sun 2B (Jan. 9, 2002);
Ronald Brownstein & James Gerstenzang, Bush Signs Education Reform Bill in Major
Bipartisan Achievement, L.A. Times A6 (Jan. 9, 2002); Elisabeth Bumiller, Focusing on
Home Front, Bush Signs Education Bill, N.Y. Times A16 (Jan. 9, 2002); Dana Milbank,
With Fanfare, Bush Signs Education Bill, Wash. Post A03 (Jan. 9, 2002); see also H.R.
Res. 1, 107th Cong. (2001).
125. Lizette Alvarez, House Votes for New Testing to Hold Schools Accountable,
N.Y. Times A1 (May 24, 2001); Lizette Alvarez, Senate Passes Bill for Annual Tests in
Public Schools, N.Y. Times A1 (June 15, 2001); Krista Kafer, Last Chance for Congress
to Redo Education Bills, Houston Chron. 47 (June 15, 2001) ("Polls show that a clear
majority of Americans back President Bush's education reform plan. What a shame,
then, that the legislation being debated in Congress is about as close to his original
proposal as a first-grade book report is to a doctoral dissertation. It didn't take long for
the president's education plan ... to go from 'No Child Left Behind' to 'No Lobbyist
Left Behind."').
126. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, H.R. Res. 1, 107" Cong. § 1lll(b)(3)(A)
(2001) (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6301 et seq.) ("Each State plan shall demonstrate
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states to concisely compile and widely disseminate the results
127
of the tests to the public. This data must be "disaggregated"
to describe how "economically disadvantaged students; students from major racial and ethnic groups; students with disabilities; and students with limited English proficiency" are
128
performing. The Act requires states to develop tests that are
"consistent with widely accepted professional testing standards, objectively measure academic achievement, knowledge,
and skills, and ... do not evaluate or assess personal or family
beliefs and attitudes, or publicly disclose personally identifiable
. fiormat"wn. ,129
m
The tests are a step in the right direction because they are
necessary to develop an accurate measurement of the adequacy
of each school. To effectively reform education, parents and
administrators must know which schools and students need
additional help. A specific and accurate diagnosis through testing will aid in deciding which course of treatment is needed for
individual schools and will help both policy makers and courts
target reforms where they are needed.
However, some people question the usefulness of the tests
for a variety of reasons. Dennis K. Chaconas, Oakland, California, Superintendent of Schools cautions that the tests are simply a means of analysis and cannot be seen as the cure in itself.
"I can get on the scale and it'll tell me how much I weigh, that
part's easy. But if I don't get on the scale and analyze how I got
to that weight, I don't think it helps me to change my behavior."130 Therefore, as Chaconas suggests, reform must not stop
with testing.
Another concern is the impact of yearly testing in the classroom. Some critics argue that teachers will teach to the test at

that the State has implemented a set of high-quality, yearly student academic assessments that include, at a minimum, academic assessments in mathematics, and reading
or language arts, that will be used as the primary means of determining the yearly performance of the State and of each local educational agency and school in enabling all
children to meet the State's challenging student academic achievement standards.");
see George Archibald, Education Reform Faces Hill Hurdle, Wash. Times A2 (June 16,
2001); Helen Dewar, Senate Passes Major Revamp of Education, Wash. Post A1 (June
15, 2001).
127. See No Child Left Behind Act, H.R. Res. 107th Cong. § llll(b) (2001).
128. See H.R. Res. 107th Cong. § llll(b)(2)(C)(v)(IJ) (2001).
129. See H.R. Res. 107th Cong. § 1111(b)(3)(C)(xiv) (2001).
130. Megan Garvey, Trouble May Lurk in Details of Education Bill, L.A. Times
A12 (June 16, 2001).
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131

the expense of a more demanding curriculum. Others notice
a sense of resentment of testing by parents who may choose to
132
have their children boycott the tests. These concerns can be
minimized as long as states design their tests to be short, accurate, and aligned with proper achievement standards.
The commonly-quoted goal of the Bush Administration in
pursuing education reform is to require accountability. The
original proposal sought accountability by imposing standardized tests, creating consequences for failing schools, and instituting private school choice through a $1,500 voucher for stu133
dents at consistently failing schools.
As the legislation
worked its way through Congress, the accountability theme
diminished.
The voucher proposal died in committee and was replaced
by a limited form of public school choice. Once a school has
failed the state's standardized tests for three consecutive years,
students are granted their share of that school's Title I funds to
transfer to either another public school within the same district, or the student can use the funds to purchase private tutoring.134 After yet another year of failure, despite additional
federal funding, the school would be required to reconstitute itself by becoming a charter school or by bringing in new teach. . l 135
ers or pnnc1pa
s.
However, true accountability requires assessment and consequences. The Act falls short of providing significant and immediate consequences. The compromise legislation seems to
131. Testing. . Testing . .. Testing: Bush has Inspired a Radical Shift in Education
Policy, Newsday B1 (Editorial, June 24, 2001) ("Having so many [tests] will take a big
bite out of class time. And, since money will ride on the outcomes, schools will avidly
prepare kids for the tests."); Lorraine Woellert, The Shape of School Reform, Bus. Week
84 (May 14, 2001) ("[S]chools try by any means necessary to get test scores up. Such
efforts have included narrowing instruction, cheating, pushing students into special
education classes, or forcing them out of school altogether."); Linda Lutton, Testing,
Testing: The Miseducation of George W. Bush, In These Times (Chi.) 20 (June 25, 2001).
132. A Tutorial in Compromise, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette A18 (Editorial, June 1,
2001).
133. Lisa Fine, ESEA, Minus Voucher, Easily Passes House, 20 Educ. Week 24
(May 20, 2001).
134. Alvarez, House Votes for New Testing to Hold Schools Accountable, supra n.
125; Dewar, supra n. 126; see H.R. Res. 1, 107th Cong. § 1116(b)(1)(E) (2001).
135. See H.R. Res. 1, 107th Cong. § 1116(b)(7)-(8); see generally Lizette Alvarez,
Testing Requirement to Stay in House Bill on Education, N.Y. Times A22 (May 23,
2001); Alvarez, Senate Passes Bill for Annual Tests in Public Schools, supra n. 125;
Fine, supra n. 133; Michael Greve, School Reform Yields to Politics, L.A. Times M1
(June 24, 2001).
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bend over backwards to accommodate the needs of the schools,
yet offers little from the perspective of the students and parents. From the family's point of view, once their school is labeled "failing" they are offered no recourse for three years. Just
imagine the impact of three years of inadequate schooling on
the child, and imagine the parents' frustration that a federally
mandated school report card tells them that the school is giving
their child an inadequate education, yet the law leaves them
powerless to do anything about it.

2. The Ongoing Resistance to Any Form of School Choice
The education reform bill contains little in the way of supporting parental choice. Aside from the limited public school
choice provision, Congress has continued to shy away from any
meaningful form of school choice. While the original proposal of
the Bush administration did contain a provision for a private
school voucher experiment, the administration quickly acquiesced when it became clear that opponents in Congress would
kill the entire education bill if even a limited voucher plan were
136
included.
Required compromise combined with powerful entrenched interests tends to land any reform adjacent to, if not
in the middle of, the status quo. m
Voucher proposals again arose in the form of amendments
138
before the full chambers. House Majority Leader Dick Armey
proposed two school choice amendments: one reinserting the
Bush administration's $1,500 voucher proposal; the second,
139
creating a pilot voucher program.
Both amendments were
easily defeated. In the Senate, Senator Judd Gregg of New
Hampshire offered an amendment to create a voluntary pilot
program in ten cities. The amendment would have used $50
million to fund vouchers for low-income students attending fail136. See Hel'm Dewar, Bush's Education Plan Moving Ahead Again - But not
Quickly, Wash. Post A2 (July 23, 2001); Greve, supra n. 129; Ruben Navarrette, Jr.,
Children: Choices & Lessons, Milwaukee J. Sentinel 01J (June 24, 2001); Scott Lehigh,
Democrat's Illogic on Vouchers, Boston Globe A27 (June 15, 2001).
137. Chester E. Finn, Jr., Revolutions Likely From this Education Bill, Houston
Chronicle 27 (July 18, 2001) (Finn, the architect of the Bush administration's original
proposal, stated: "The spinners would have us believe that this measure will transform
American education. The more likely outcome is that little will change.").
138. See generally Congressional Record May 23, 2001 for the House amendment
and June 12, 2001 for the Senate amendment.
139. See id; Alvarez, House Votes for New Testing to Hold Schools Accountable, SU·
pra n. 125; Fine, supra n. 133.
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ing schools. The proposed funds would have come from money
140
already earmarked for education. This modest proposal was
easily defeated as opponents reacted with sharp disapproval to
every proposed test of the voucher concept. 141

3. Verdict: How Does this Bill Help Students?
The Leave No Child Behind Act of 2001 is a step in the
right direction, yet falls far short of being a major education reform. The testing requirement is its silver lining. Any school
choice system requires the information provided by mandatory
testing to function effectively. Despite growing resistance from
the education establishment, this Act integrates the concept of
testing and outcome measurement into the mainstream American education policy. That is a step in the right direction. Perhaps years from now, when the results of these tests come
pouring in, the majority will be shocked into supporting significant education reform rather than believing the spin and cries
of the entrenched educational establishment.
IV. BARRIERS TO CHOICE-BASED EDUCATION REFORM

A proposal for restructuring the educational system based
on the theory of school choice faces significant legal and political barriers. The major legal obstacles to school choice are issues concerning desegregation and the separation of church
and state. A system of school choice also faces strong political
opposition from many powerful organizations and policymakers
with an interest in maintaining the status quo.

A Legal Obstacles to School Choice
Despite the good intentions of education professionals and
policymakers, efforts for change are constrained by several
prevailing legal doctrines. The most daunting roadblocks to
140. Fine, supra n. 133; Lehigh, supra n. 136.
141. Mathew Miller, Denying School Vouchers Hurts Kids, Charleston Gazette 4A
(June 18, 2001) ("Here's how ideologically constipated the debate over schools has become: New Hampshire Republican Sen. Judd Gregg's call for an unbelievably tiny and
inoffensive voucher pilot program was considered too radical to include in the hollow
education reform endorsed by the Senate."); see Lehigh, supra n. 136 (Some arguments
against testing the voucher concept rely on highly circular reasoning leading to "a conceptual Catch-22: We shouldn't fund research to see if vouchers work because there's
no research to show that vouchers work.").
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school reforms based on school choice include: 1) adherence to a
policy of strict desegregation to such an extreme as to forget
the original goal of integration; and 2) continuing a policy of
strict separation of church and state that denies assistance to
families who choose to send their children to parochial schools.
1. A Pyrrhic Desegregation Policy
Ironically, reform efforts to ensure equal educational opportunity have faced opposition from people pursuing a strict desegregation enforcement policy. These well-intentioned people
have confused the means with the ends in providing for equal
education through the desegregation doctrine established in
142
Brown v. Board of Education.
The Court's reasoning in
Brown implied that the purpose of integration was to ensure
that racial minorities received an equal educational opportunity. The court asked, "Does segregation of children in public
schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive the
children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities?"143 The Court implied that equal, "tangible" factors are
necessary elements of an equal opportunity education, and
then ordered integration so that racial minorities could attend
the effective and quality schools that were previously open only
144
to whites.
Instead of following the principle of equal educational opportunities, many strict desegregation proponents have con145
fused the issue and focused on integration as the goal.
The
Court in Brown found that a state mandate of separate schools
for different races imposes a significant and harmful feeling of
146
inferiority on racial minorities.
The elimination of explicit,
state-mandated segregation by law since Brown has addressed
this issue. But merely being able to sit in the same classroom
with whites has not resulted in the equal education envisioned
147
by those that support a policy of strict desegregation.
Legal
142. See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals
and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L .•J. 4 70 (1976).
143. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
144. !d.
145. See Bell, 8Upra n. 142.
146. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
147. Denise C. Morgan, The Less Polite Questions: Race, Place, Poverty and Public
Education, 1998 Annual Survey of Am. L. 267, 274 (1998).
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scholar Derrick Bell addressed the problem committed by
groups pursuing a strict desegregation agenda, noting: "This
theory of school desegregation, however, fails to encompass the
complexity of achieving equal educational opportunity for chil148
dren to whom it so long has been denied." Bell describes how
those focusing on desegregation goals have lost sight of the
original purpose of desegregation-to ensure that minority
149
students receive a quality education.
Adherence to a strict desegregation policy frequently denies
improved educational o~Rortunity to the very people desegregation seeks to protect. ° For example, North Carolina regulates the racial composition of its charter schools. As a result,
North Carolina closed 22 schools because they contained too
many African-American students fleeing ineffective public
151
schools.
A program in Detroit designed to create three allblack male schools was challenged by the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Organization for Women as unconstitutional. The program was later struck down as unconstitutional.152
While integration remains an important social goal, many
now agree that it should not be sought at the expense of a quality education for poor and minority children. In a recent national survey, eighty percent of African American parents
stated they would Erefer schools to focus on achievement rather
1
than integration.
This preference combined with most parents' preference that children are educated in their neighborhood schools should emEhasize the wisdom of avoiding a policy
14
of strict desegregation.

148. See Bell, supra n. 142, at 477-78.
149. ld.
150. Herrig, supra n. 79.
151. Viteritti, supra n. 6, at 70 (citing David J. Dent, Diversity Rules Threaten
North Carolina Charter Schools That Aid Blacks, N.Y. Times, B8 (December 23, 1998);
Lynne Schnaiberg, Predominantly Black Charters Focus of Debate in N.C., 17 Educ.
Week 22 (August 5, 1998)).
152. Barnes, supra n. 80, at 2377-78 (citing Garrett v. Bd. of Educ., 775 F. Supp.
1004 (E.D. Mich. 1991)).
153. Viteritti, supra n. 6, at 70.
154. I d. at 33.
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2. A First Amendment Issue: School Choice and Religious
Schools
The doctrine of separation of church and state also created
a barrier to complete freedom of school choice. The First
Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
155
thereof." Those that interpret the First Amendment as a ban
on any connection between the state and religious institutions
("separationists") oppose government funding of families to
send their children to sectarian schools.
The recognition of a strict separation between church and
state in the context of aid to schools can be traced to the Su156
preme Court decision of Everson v. Board of Education.
In
Everson, the Court upheld a New Jersey statute that provided
reimbursement of transportation costs to parents of children
attending parochial schools. In doing so, the Court noted the
existence of a delicate balance that must be struck in providing
state funding to religious institutions and individuals. "New
Jersey ... cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their
faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare
157
legislation." By striking this balance in Everson, the Court
recognized that people of faith cannot be denied access to publicly granted welfare services. Thus, the Court held that parents who exercise their option to send their children to religious schools are protected by the First Amendment's Free
Exercise Clause and cannot be denied the aid and services
158
granted to others.
Unfortunately for school choice proponents, subsequent
courts restricted funding of religious schools using the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause. In Abington School District v. Schempp, the Supreme Court outlined a strict standard
to determine what government action violates the Establishment Clause:
155. U.S. Const. amend. I.
156. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
157. ld. at 16.
158. Jd. at 17. ("Measured by these standards, we cannot say that the First
Amendment prohibits New Jersey from spending tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares
of parochial school pupils as a part of a general program under which it pays the fares
of pupils attending public and other schools.").
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The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and
the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the
scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
159
re 11g10n.
0

0

Eight years later, the "purpose and effect" reasoning of
Abington School District was expanded into a restrictive and
160
imprecise test in Lemon v. Kurzman.
The Supreme Court
constructed a test to determine if a state statute supplementing the salary of private school teachers and reimbursing private schools for books and teaching materials violated the Es161
tablishment Clause. In finding this funding unconstitutional,
the Court created the "Lemon Test." The "Lemon Test" states
that government action violates the Establishment clause
when it: 1) has no "secular purpose," 2) has a "primary effect" of
advancing religion, and 3) fosters "excessive entanglement" be162
tween church and state.
This strict-separationist standard
soon inhibited state aid to students attending parochial
163
schools.
In 1973, in Committee for Public Education and Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, the Court struck down a New York statute
that, inter alia, granted tax relief to parents who sent their
children to a parochial school. The Court found that even an
indirect-aid program "cannot be squared with the principle of
164
neutrality" and runs counter to the Establishment Clause.
After Nyquist, the Court continued to perceive religious interests as suspicious and strictly construed the Establishment
Clause to deny any public assistance for religious educational
165
needs.

159. 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
160. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
161. 403 U.S. 602, 606-07 (1971); SeeR. Craig Wood & Michael C. Petko, Assessing
Agostini u. Felton in Light of Lemon u. Kurzman: The Coming Age in the Debate Between Religious Affiliated Schools and State Aid, 2000 BYU Educ. & L. J. 1 (2000).
162. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612; see also Viteritti, supra n. 6, at 135.
163. See Viteritti, supra n. 6, at 135.
164. 413 U.S. 756, 793 (1973) ("[I]nsofar as such benefits render assistance to parents who send their children to sectarian schools, their purpose and inevitable affect
are to aid and advance those religious institutions.").
165. See Beggans u. Pub. Funds For Pub. Schools, 442 U.S. 907 (1980); Fran. Tax
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Over the past eighteen years, the Court has gradually softened its rigid separationist regulation of public educational
aid to children attending religious schools. The Court drew a
distinction between direct and indirect aid to religious institu166
tions in Meuller v. Allen.
In Meuller, a Minnesota statute
granted a tax deduction for books, tuition, and transportation
to parents of children attending both public and non-public
167
schools. The Court found that the Minnesota statute met the
three prongs of the Nyquist test despite the fact that the funds
168
were indirectly given to parochial schools.
This ruling
marked a significant change from the holding in Sloan v.
169
Lemon. In 1986, in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, a student used a public scholarship to attend a Bible college. The Court held that since the aid was offered to all students, the fact that some individuals chose to
exercise their faith and attend parochial schools does not cause
170
the program to run afoul of the Establishment Clause.
Through the 1990s, the Rehnquist Court continued the
trend of moving away from a strict separationist interpretation
of the First Amendment. In Zobrest u. Catalina Foothills
School District, the parents of a deaf child requested the public
school district to provide a sign language interpreter for their
child at the Roman Catholic high school he attended, claiming
that the school district was financially responsible for such a
service under the Individuals with Disabilities Education

Bd. u. United Ams. for Pub. Schools, 419 U.S. 890 (1974); Leutkemeyer u.Kaufman, 419
U.S. 888 (1974).
166. 463 u.s. 388 (1983).
167. Id. at 391.
168. I d. at 395 On finding the secular purpose of the Minnesota statute the Court
stated: "A state's decision to defray the cost of educational expenses incurred by parents-regardless of the type of schools their children attend-evidences a purpose that
is both secular and understandable. An educated populace is essential to the political
and economic health of any community, and a state's efforts to assist parents in meeting the rising cost of educational expenses plainly serves this secular purpose of ensuring that the state's citizenry is well-educated.)
169. 414 U.S. 881 (1973); see Viteritti, supra n. 6, at 137; Wood & Petko, supra n.
155, at 4-5.
170. 474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986) ("As far as the record shows, vocational assistance
provided under the Washington program is paid directly to the student, who transmits
it to the educational institution of his or her choice. Any aid provided under Washington's program that ultimately flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of
the genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients.").
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171
Act.
The Court ruled that providing a publicly-employed in172
terpreter did not violate the Establishment Clause.
Finally, in 1997, the Court explicitly overturned its previous decisions regarding the Establishment Clause in Agostini
v. Felton. The Court found that a program that sends public
school teachers into private schools to teach remedial lessons
173
does not violate the Establishment Clause.
In this 5-4 decision, the Court recognized the recent shift in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence by noting that its previous decisions were
"not consistent with our subsequent Establishment Clause decisions."174 The majority opinion expressly rejected several presumptions the Court had previously relied upon. First, the
Court rejected the presumption that "the placement of public
employees on parochial school grounds inevitably results in the
impermissible effect of state-sponsored indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic union between government and religion."m
Second, the Court discarded the presumption that all public
aid is unconstitutional which directly benefits education in religious schools because the aid might create a financial incen176
tive for parents to choose a parochial school education.
The
Court declared that:
[t]his incentive is not present, however, where the aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis.
Under such circumstances the aid is less likely to have the ef177
fect of advancing religion.

Agostini also secured the principle that a government program is insulated from a violation of the Establishment Clause
171. 20 U.S.C 1400, et. seq. (West 2001); Zobrest u. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist.,
509 U.S. 1, 3 (1993); See Wood & Petko, supra n. 155, at 6.
172. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13-14.
173. 521 U.S. 203, 208-09, 218 (1997) (A "Shared Time" program where the public
school district provided remedial classes to students attending nonpublic schools to be
a violation of the Establishment Clause overturning School District of Grand Rapids u.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985). Likewise, the Court found that a New York City program
that sent public school teachers into private schools to provide remedial education to
disadvantaged students pursuant to Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, violated the Establishment Clause overturning Aguilar v. Felton, 473
U.S. 402.).
174. !d. at 209.
175. !d. at 223.
176. !d. at 225-227.
177. !d. at 231.
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when private citizens make the decision whether to direct public funds to religious organizations. The Court explained:
In our view, this transaction [is] no different from a State's issuing a paycheck to one of its employees, knowing that the
employee would donate part or all of the check to a religious
institution. In both situations, any money that ultimately
went to religious institutions did so "only as a result of the
178
genuinely independent and private choices of' individuals.

Based on these recent United States Supreme Court's decisions, it is likely that a properly drafted school choice program
that includes a parochial school option could be found constitutional.179
In contrast, many state constitutions contain provisions for
180
explicitly strict separation. The "Blaine Amendments" were
adopted in the mid-nineteenth century, often as a requirement
for a states' admission to the union, reflecting the anti-Catholic
181
fervor.
Thirteen states still have constitutional provisions
182
narrowing public funds to public school use only. As a result,
school choice opponents often seek to litigate in state courts
. .
l argumen t s. 183
un d er state consbtutwna
However, this does not mean that school choice opponents
are guaranteed victory in state courts. Recently in Wisconsin,
the state's highest court found a school choice program constitutional based on reasoning similar to Justice O'Connor's opinion in Agostini. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held:

178. Id. at 226 (citations omitted).
179. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Linda Greenhouse, White House
asks Court for Voucher Ruling, N.Y. Times, 19 (,July 8, 2001); see also Nation Needs
Ruling on Voucher Legality, Indianapolis Star A06 (Editorial, .July 16, 2001).
180. Viteritti, supra n. 6, at 17; see Alaska Const. art. VII, § 1; Ariz. Const. art. II,
12; Cal. Const. art. IX, § 8; Colo. Const. art. V, § 34, art. IX, § 7; Del. Const. art X, § 3;
Fla. Const. art. I, § 3; Ga. Const. art. 1, § 2, P VII; Haw. Const. art. X, § 1; Idaho Const.
art. IX, § 5; Ill. Const. art. X. § 3; Ind. Const. art. I, § 6; Ky. Const. § 189; Mass. Const.
art. XVIII; Mich. Const. art. VIII, § 2; Minn. Const. art. I, § 16, art. XII, § 2; Mo. Const.
art. IX, § 8; Mont. Const. art. X, § 6; Neb. Const. art. VII, § 11; N.H. Const. pt. II, art.
83; N.M. Const. art. XII, § 3; N.Y. Const. art. XI, § 3; N.D. Const. art. VIII, § 5; Okla.
Const. art. II, § 5; Or. Const. art. I, § 5; Pa. Const. art. III, § 29; S.C. Const. art. XI, § 4;
S.D. Const. art. VI, § 3; Tex. Const. art. I, § 7; Utah Const. art. I, § 4, art. X, § 9; Wash.
Const. art. I, § 11; Wis Const .. art. I, § 18; Wyo. Const. art. I § 19.
181. /d. at 153 (citing Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36
Am. J. Legal History 38 (1992)) (Blaine's amendment sought to undermine "the viability of schools run by religious minorities.").
182. Id. at 169.
183. Id. at 168.
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[E]ducational assistance programs do not have the primary
effect of advancing religion if those programs provide public
aid to both sectarian and nonsectarian institutions (1) on the
basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion; and (2) only as a result of numerous IJrivate
84
choices of the individual parents of school-age children.

If drafters skillfully design the school choice program, it is
foreseeable that this decision can be replicated in other states
as well.
This optimistic outlook is partially based on the court's reasoning in the most recent voucher decision in Simmons-Harris
185
v. Zelman.
In Simmons-Harris, the Sixth Circuit Court held
that the Ohio Pilot Project Scholarship Program violated the
Establishment Clause and provided guidance on how to craft a
school choice program that would pass constitutional muster.
The Court's decision turned on the issue of whether the program provided parents with sufficiently wide and diverse
ranges of options between parochial and nonsectarian schools
to avoid the effect of overwhelmingly funding religious institutions. The Court held that the particular structure of the Ohio
voucher program discouraged participation of non-sectarian
schools, thereby limiting school choices predominantly to relig186
iously-affiliated schools.
The Court held that the Ohio
voucher program impermissibly advances religion under the
Lemon test because the Ohio voucher law does not limit the
187
uses of the funds to non-religious activities.
Contrary to the beliefs of anti-voucher activists, this holding does not conclude that all voucher programs that include
religious schools are unconstitutional. The decision only held
that the particular Ohio program violated the Establishment
Clause. In fact, the Court's decision in Simmons-Harris sheds
some light on what the court would find to be a permissible

184. Jackson, 578 N.W. 2d at 617.
185. 234 F.3d 945.
186. !d. at 959, 961.
187. !d. at 958 ("We find that Nyquist governs our result. Factually, the program
at hand is a tuition grant program for low-income parents whose children attend private school parallel to the tuition reimbursement program found impermissible in Nyquist. Under both the New York statute in Nyquist, as well as the Ohio Statute at issue, parents receive government funds, either in direct payment for private school
tuition or as a reimbursement for the same, and in both cases, the great majority of
schools benefited by these tuition dollars are sectarian.").

94

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2002

voucher system - one with diverse options and limits on the
school's use of the tuition grant.
B. Political Barriers to School Reform

Having examined the court-established barriers to school
choice, we can now identipr daunting obstacle to implementa18
tion by political process. The first obstacle is how to politically empower the section of the populace that the reform is designed to help. People living in poverty traditionally have not
had the ability to generate a large, effective political movement.189 This political disadvantage is compounded when one
considers that the more politically-potent, white, middle-class
suburbanites tend to believe that their schools are effective and
tend to be less sensitive to the concerns of urban parents, who
190
are not nearly as content with their schools. It is easy to see
how the relatively weak voices of the poor, urban residents are
drowned out by a broad coalition of large well-financed interests opposing structural education reform.
The second obstacle is the perpetual American partisan
battle for power which significantly impedes school choice reform efforts. The Democratic Party, seen as the party strongly
favored by minorities and the poor, strongly opposes most
19
choice-centered school reforms.
On the other hand, the Republican party of big business and "small government" gener188. Viteritti, supra n. 6, at 38 (citing William N. Evans, et a!., Schoolhouses,
Courthouses, and Statehouses After Serrano, 16 J. Policy Analysis & Mgmt. 10 (1997)).
189. See Morgan, supra n. 147, at 281 ("People .. .in these communities of concentrated poverty are not well positioned to bring about change. [They]lack mid-class and
working class families necessary to spearhead political activism or maintain institutions that provide quality services.").
190. See id. at 281-284 (Opponents of choice have caught on to this fact. They are
able to mobilize opposition to change by scaring the suburbanites with claims that reform proposals will fund underperforming schools at the expense of more affluent
schools.).
191. Lehigh, supra n. 136 ("The failing schools disproportionately serve students
from minority families of modest means - families the Democratic Party counts as a
key constituency. But vouchers are anathema to the educational establishment, which
helps power the party's electioneering efforts."); Peter Schrag, The Voucher Seduction:
The Issue Liberals Can't Ignore, 11 The Am. Prospect 46 (Nov. 23, 1999) (Former
Berkeley law professor John E. Coons, a Democrat, remarked: "Where are those Democratic politicians who so constantly assure us of their deep concern for the not-sorich? So far as I can tell, the Democrats (my own party) are either running these state
schools that warehouse the poor or-with the help of the teachers' unions-are busy in
the legislatures and Congress making sure that nothing in this system changes except
its ever-expanding cost. The rich choose; the poor get conscripted.).
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192

ally supports choice-based school reforms.
Partisanship further complicates reform efforts as the minority community's
Democratic partisan leanings make that community skeptical
of any reform plan offered by members of the Republican
193
Party. Likewise, members of the Democratic Party reject reform plans beneficial to urban minorities simply because they
194
are plans offered by the opposition.
At the same time, some Republicans support school choice
to draw minority votes away from the Democrats without intending to implement a broad, effective choice plan once
elected. Critics also point out that the powerful "Religious
Right" Republican constituency strongly supports some schoolchoice plans to increase attendance and funding at parochial
195
schools.
In this partisan tug-of-war, politicians frame the school
choice issue to their best political advantage at the expense of
blurring the truth about various school choice plans. As a result, misinformation infects the general public, which votes according to party preferences rather than independent analysis
196
of the issue on its merits. For example, in Michigan and California, various referenda proposed school choice reforms, including voucher programs; however, partisanship undermined
197
the viability and success of these referenda.
The two major
parties' struggle for power impedes the implementation of
198
choice-based school reforms.
192. Gary Rosen, Are School Vouchers Un-American?, 109 Commentary 26 (February 2000).
193. Bruce Fuller & Richard F. Elmore, Policy Making in the Dark: Illuminating
the School Choice Debate, in Who Chooses? Who Loses?: Culture, Institutions, and the
Unequal Effects of School Choice 3 (Bruce Fuller & Richard F. Elmore eds., Teacher's
College Press 1996) ((This skepticism may also be due to the fact that school choice
originally developed in the South as a white response to integration orders. Years later
it again became popular in the 1980's among political conservatives who sought to "advance the cultural and political homogeneity of particular communities.")
194. See Schrag, supra n. 191
195. Lynette Clemetson, A Ticket to Private School, Newsweek, 30 (March 27,
2000).
196. See Elizabeth Garrett, The Law and Economics of"lnformed Voter" Ballot Notations, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1533 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why
Groups Go to Extremes, 110 Yale L.J. 71 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Group Dynamics, 12
Cardozo Stud. L. & Literature 129 (2000); Tom Bray, Debacle at the Voucher Frontiers,
Wash. Times A21 (Nov. 10, 2000).
197. Thomas D. Elias, School Vouchers Set Back at Polls; Billionaire Backers
Ready to Try Again, Wash. Times A16 (Nov. 8, 2000).
198. See Miller, supra n. 135.
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The perception of the voucher/school choice issue in the
general political debate is the common myth that vouchers are
a conservative cause. Describing an issue as conservative,
right-wing, or religious alienates a broad spectrum of the voting population. Mainstream media tends to characterize issues
199
in terms of partisanship.
For example, Cynthia Tucker, a
journalist, framed the issue as a conservative cause:
199. See Michael A. Fletcher, A Good Report Card-Self-Administered, Wash. Post
A21 (July 31, 2001) ("Conservatives are steamed about the concessions- including the
elimination of private school vouchers- made in President Bush's plan to overhaul federal education policy."); Jack Germond, Bush Can't Please All Republican Factions,
L.A. Times M1 (July 22, 2001) ("Bush has disappointed conservatives on the school
voucher question."); David Broder, Education Reform; Bush is in Danger of Losing His
Most Cherished Plan, The Dallas Morning News 9A (July 16, 2001) ("From the National Education Association ... to the Heritage Foundation and other pro-voucher
conservatives who complain that Mr. Bush already has allowed the standards to go
limp ... - all of those conflicting views and agendas remain to be resolved."); Michael
Fletcher, Paige Denies Retirement Rumors, Unhappiness With Bush, Wash. Post A31
(June 28, 2001) ("Paige linked the rumors to the mounting criticism from conservatives
unhappy with Bush's compromises on his education plan. The plan, which calls for annual testing of students in grades three through eight and for the first time ties federal
money to student performance, was stripped of the measure that most warmed conservative hearts: education vouchers. The White House caved on the proposal to offer $
1,500 vouchers to students in failing schools, even while Paige continued to publicly
support it."); Thomas B. Edsall, With Primary Looming, New Jersey's GOP Parts,
Wash. Post A02 (June 25, 2001) ("Bret Schundler ... appears to be on the verge of
defying the state's GOP establishment and winning Tuesday's gubernatorial primary.
The 42-year-old Harvard graduate, who combines hard-right conservative stands on
abortion, school vouchers and gun control with a record of striking policy and political
achievements in gritty, majority-minority Jersey City, is running ahead of former U.S.
representative Bob Franks."); Tucker, infra n. 200; Megan Garvey, Senate Won't Even
Buy a Diluted Version of Voucher Remedy, L.A. Times A16 (June 13, 2001) ("It was one
of the cornerstones of President Bush's campaign: vouchers for low-income students
caught in failing schools. But on Tuesday-to no one's surprise-the Senate defeated,
on a 58-41 vote, a last, modest effort by conservative Republicans to include a voucher
provision in education reform legislation sought by Bush."); Lizette Alvarez, Senate Rejects Tuition Aid, a Key to Bush Education Plan, N.Y. Times A26 (June13, 2001) ("But
conservatives, who have battled for years to pass vouchers, said Democrats were callously condemning poor children to horrible schools, denying them the same kind of
escape hatch afforded to wealthier students who can pay private and parochial school
tuition."); Diana Jean Schema, Bush-Backed School Bill Advances in Senate, N.Y.
Times A13 (Mar. 8, 2001) ("The bill put off consideration of divisive issues like student
vouchers that were dear to conservatives."); see also Jodi Wilgoren, Education Plan by
Bush Shows New Consensus, N.Y. Times A1 (Jan. 23, 2001) (for an example showing
how it is possible for a reporter to accurately portray the voucher issue without tainting it as 'conservative.' "On education, it seems, the political spectrum is collapsing into
near consensus, with the goal of helping a constituency long represented by liberals
using methods-competition, accountability and a focus on fundamentals-that are
conservative at their core. Disputes remain over whether to expand taxpayer-financed
vouchers for private-school tuition and over the power of teachers' unions, but broad
swaths of common ground exist in between.").
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While President Bush may not win the taxpayer-financed
school vouchers he wanted in his education bill, vouchers remain a popular idea among conservatives. Along with a few
new converts among liberals, conservatives claim that vouchers can save black and brown children stuck in failing public
200
schools.
Pieces like this contribute to the skewed polarization of the
school choice issue. Because the issue is labeled as 'conservative,' it is hardly surprising that voucher initiatives are soundly
defeated on Election Day.

1. Institutional Opposition to School Choice
The most powerful and direct opponents of school reform
are groups with a vested interest in the current educational
system: teachers' unions, school boards, and superinten201
dents .. The bureaucratic structure of public school systems in
itself is an institutional barrier to reform. Teachers seek to protect job security. Local political pressure on superintendents,
school boards, and administrators impedes progress toward
implementing school choice programs by inducing limited
terms and by promoting short-term rather than long-term reform. Bureaucratic actors balk at the broad, structural changes
that a school-choice system will necessitate in the current educational system.
l.

Teachers' Unions

One would normally expect teachers' unions to be strongly
in favor of efforts to improve schools. However, the unions oppose school-choice reform efforts for reasons other than education quality. The union primarily seeks to protect the jobs of its
members and to prevent the diversion of funds from public

200. Cynthia Tucker, Where are Rich Conservatives When Catholic School Needs
Help?, Atlanta J. -Constitution 12A (June 20, 2001).
201. Viteritti, supra n. 6, at 87; James A. Peyser, School Choice: When Not If, 35
B.C. L. Rev. 619, 622 (1994) ("The loudest critics of choice are the teachers unions and
school district administrators, who together with school committees and university
education departments comprise the core of the education establishment ... [T]hey
have a vested interest in the status quo. Public school systems have a virtual monopoly
on elementary and secondary education in this country, and like all monopolists they
want to protect their franchise.").
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202

schools. A recent editorial in the Atlanta Journal and Constitution stated:
Teachers' organizations would have you believe they are dedicated to only one thing: ensuring the best possible educational
environment for the students they teach. Yet, if you watch local teachers' groups closely enough, you will see a pattern of
behavior that suggests a very different mission - ensuring the
203
highest wages and laxest standards for schoolteachers.

The teachers' unions continue to advance the interests of
their members, often at the expense of the quality of education
received by their students. For example, in 1998, the NEA defeated a proposal by the superintendent of the Dayton, Ohio,
schools to turn over management of five underperforming
schools to the Edison Project, a for-profit school management
corporation. The union articulated fears that Edison would require teachers to work longer hours, extend the school year,
and promote contractual agreements between teachers and
204
schools outside of those negotiated by the union.
Recently,
the following provision was included in the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001:
SEC. 9530. LIMITATIONS ON NATIONAL TESTING OR
CERTIFICATION FOR TEACHERS.
(a)
MANDATORY
NATIONAL
TESTING
OR
CERTIFICATION OF TEACHERS-Notwithstanding any
other provision of this Act or any other provision of law, no
funds available to the Department or otherwise available under this Act may be used for any purpose relating to a mandatory nationwide test or certification of teachers or education
paraprofessionals, including any planning, development, implementation, or administration of such test or certification.

202. See Harmer, supra n. 88, at 58-60, 139-43; Jeffrey R. Henig, Richard C. Hula
& Desiree S. Pedescleaux, The Color of School Reform: Race Politics and The Challenge
of Urban Education 116-17, 127-37, 152-53 (Princeton U. Press, 1999).
203. Henig, Hula & Pedescleaux, supra n. 202, at 116 (citing Cynthia Tucker, Kids'
Interests Come Second, Atlanta J. & Const. A13 (Oct. 20, 1993); see also Andrew Mollison, Unions Fighting Federal Teacher-Testing Legislation, Chattanooga Times A1
(June 23, 2001).
204. Viteritti, supra n. 6, at 69.
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(b) PROHIBITION ON WITHHOLDING FUNDS-The Secretary is prohibited from withholding funds from any State educational agency or local educational agency if the State educational agency or local educational agency fails to adopt a
205
specific method of teacher or paraprofessional certification.

It is hard to deny the fingerprints of the powerful teachers'
unions on that provision. The teachers' unions, armed with
budgets in the millions, pose a formidable obstacle to the pro. of sc h oo1 ch mce
. programs. 206
motwn

ii. Superintendents

The limited term served by superintendents stifles progress
toward school-choice programs. The average term of a superin207
tendent in large cities is less than three years. Since they are
not typically in office long enough to implement lasting reform,
superintendents are apt to reject any structural changes in favor of short-term, "fad" initiatives in order to show some improvement.208 Also, upon the superintendent's departure, the
new superintendent quickly dismantles or supercedes his or
her predecessor's reform programs, often despite signs of posi209
tive results. High turnover rate makes it virtually impossible
to rely on the leadership of superintendents to implement a
structural transformation.

205. See H.R. Res. 107"' Cong. § 9530.
206. Christopher D. Pixley, The Next Frontier in Public School Finance Reform: A
Policy & Constitutional Analysis of School Choice Legislation, 24 J. Legis. 21 (1998)
(The National Education Association has an annual budget of $750 million and an annual political action fund of $22.5 million.).
207. Frederick M. Hess, Spinning Wheels: The Politics of Urban School Reform 14
(Brookings lnstn. Press 1999).
208. ld; see also Henig, Hula & Pedescleaux, supra n. 202, at 13 (Small schoolbased programs have become the dominant and continuing response. The constant implementation of 'fad' initiatives may be adding to the problems faced by failing schools.
"A natural concomitant to the multiplicity of the programs, however, is that they are
often uncoordinated and may even be counterproductive in terms of student learning.
The addition of new prof,>Tams on top of old ones may result in a disjointed and fragmented set of experiences for students .... Much of school life seems to follow an endless cycle of soliciting funds, implementing new initiatives, and then going out to solicit
more funds for even newer initiatives to replace current ones.").
209. Hill & Celio, supra n. 29, at 3.
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iii. School Boards
School boards also contribute to the opposition of schoolreform plans that include choice. In many inadequate urban
school districts, the status quo and its proponents have captured vulnerable school boards. Many school boards tend to be
focused on "the employment and career needs of administrators
and employees" to the detriment of the filuality of education of21
fered to the children of their district.
For example, in districts where the legislatures have allowed the founding of charter schools with the approval of the school board, the board has
211
given charters to very few that apply. This has the effect of
maintaining the current system by further repressing competition with public schools.
iv. Bureaucratic Structure of School Systems
The districts organize public school systems into large bureaucracies.212 Traditional bureaucratic structure has a built-in
bias favoring the preservation of the status quo. Thus the
highly bureaucratic nature of the educational system inherently works against any proposed structural changes such as
school choice. "Since bureaucratic organizations have been established to impose a degree of order on an otherwise unplanned and chaotic environment, there is a certain drive toward permanency and self-perpetuation at the heart of rational
213
bureaucracy." Consequently, local political pressure conflicts
with, and essentially thwarts, the goal of educating children.
The entrenchment of antiquated methods retards the develop214
ment of a school choice system.

210. Aaron Saiger, Disestablishing Local School Districts as a Remedy for Educational Inadequacy, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1830, 1869 (1999) (citing Wilbur C. Rich, Black
Mayors and Sehoul Politics 4-5 (Garland Publg. 1996)).
211. Viteritti, supra n. 6, at 70, 72, 75; Neal R. Pierce, Charter Schools-and Those
Who Resist Them, The Baltimore Sun llA (Nov. 6, 1996) ("In state after state, local
school boards and teacher unions are trying to quash charters. The reason: The spirited, upstart charter schools - usually created by groups of teachers, parents or local
colleges - are a threat to established school bureaucracies and unions' exclusive bargaining rights.").
212. See Diane Ravitch, supra n. 1; Daniel U. Levine, Concepts of Bureaucracy in
Urban School Reform, in Transforming Urban Education 99 (Joseph Kretovics & Edward J. Nussel eds., Allyn and Bacon 1994).
213. Levine, supra n. 212, at 101.
214. Id.
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A system of patronage plagues the administrative bureaucracy and averts progress. Combined, the patronage system and
the resulting lack of qualified administrators erect major obstacles to structural school reform. In urban cities, people seek
positions as administrators in the public school system because
of the high pay rate, especially for African-American workers.215 As a result, recent studies of large cities have shown that
the school system has essentially become a job program under
a system of political patronage where local government rewards campai~n supporters with administrative jobs in the
16
public schools. Using a system of patronage to fill administrative positions results in political decisions rather than deci217
.
fiore d ucat.wna 1 Improvements.
.
swns
2. External Opposition to School Choice

Another somewhat surprising form of opposition to granting
choice to poor and minority students stems from various civil
rights groups. These civil rights groups, including the NAACP,
215. James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 Yale L.J. 249, 295 (1999) (citing Amy Stuart Wells & Robert L. Crain, Stepping over the Color Line: AfricanAmerican Students in White Suburban Schools 130 (Yale U. Press 1997)); see also
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 202 ("For example, Willard H. Murray, an African-American Democrat who represented Compton, California, for eight years until he retired in 1996,
believes that school boards in some poor minority communities have become centers of
patronage because they are one of the only large employers in town. As a result,
Murray suggests, 'the focus becomes political, not educational."').
216. Ryan, supra n. 215, at 295; Saiger, supra n. 210, at 1858-59 n.137 ("District
officials, dependent on and close to the local electorate, but functioning with relatively
little visibility or media attention, thus face demands for employment, and sometimes
for patronage and nepotism, that can be at least as strong as demands for quality education. Temptations and opportunities for corruption may also be greater at the district
than at the state level."); Peter Applebome, Failure Calls Illinois City Home Turf, N.Y.
Times A16 (Oct. 30, 1994) (noting that "contracts and jobs [are] apportioned to friends
or relatives of school board members" in East St. Louis, Illinois).
217. For example, during the 1970's and the 1980's in Baltimore, an alliance developed between black professional educators, City Hall, and the school system. Henig,
Hula & Pedescleaux, supra n. 202, at 123-24 (citing Kenneth Wong, City Choices, 115
(St. U. of N.Y. Press 1990); Horwitz & Strauss, supra n. 66) ("Increasingly, the school
district resembled a patronage base. Personnel that orchestrated mayoral activities
were put on the school system's payroll." Evidence of rampant patronage has also been
recently reported in the Washington, D.C. public school system. The Washington Post
conducted a study of the family and personal relationships among school employees
finding "a host of connections," between principals, assistant principals, administrators
and other employees. "[S]chool board member Angie Corley, who made $15,000 a year
was joined on the payroll by her daughter, Gwenellen, a $49,096-a-year vice principal,
and her son, William, a $35,054-a-year science teacher.").
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the National Urban League, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and the Rainbow/PUSH Coalition, criticize
school choice as promoting resegregation and eroding separation of church and state. The civil rights groups argue this is
accomplished by draining money from the public schools, not
holding choice schools accountable, and including schools that
218
do not accept all applicants. The civil rights groups, pursuing
a strategy of strict desegregation, point to defective plans as
examples of how all possible school choice programs would operate.
Unfortunately, these civil rights groups are in disagreement
with the very people for whom which they are fighting. Recent
polls show that choice plans are gaining support among poor
urban parents and also amon~ such groups as the Black Alli2 9
ance for Educational Options.
Opponents to school choice who object on the basis of possible resegre~ation base their reasoning on several faulty as20
sumptions.
Opponents critique policymakers deciding to implement a universal school choice system where every child
221
receives a "voucher." For example, a recent article stated:
218. Salim Muwakkil, School Choice: Do Vouchers Help of Harm Black Children?,
In These Times 11 (Jan. 11, 1998).
219. Matthew Franck, Black Parents Have Growing Role in Debate Over Public
School Alternatives, St. Louis Post-Dispatch B4 (July 22, 2001) (Support for school
choice among African Americans "isn't likely to result in a shift in public policy" because "black advocacy groups like the NAACP still oppose vouchers, as do older African
Americans- who are more likely to vote .... The Black Alliance for Educational Options, armed with a stockpile of private donations, is rousing support nationally among
African-Americans for alternatives to traditional public schools."); Rosen, supra n. 192
("Unsurprisingly, given these results, interest in school choice has risen greatly over
the last few years among inner-city families. One survey found that 85 percent of the
urban poor now favor vouchers; another put support for the idea at 59 percent among
blacks and 68 percent among Latinos. As if to prove these figures, when the Children's
Scholarship Fund, the largest of the private voucher programs, recently announced its
first national lottery for 40,000 scholarships, applications poured in from an astonishing 1.25 million children, all from low-income households"); Maijorie Coeyman, Vouchers Get a Boost From Black Alliance, The Christian Science Monitor 19 (July 10, 2001)
(In a 1999 survey by the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, 76 percent of
African Americans between the ages of 26-35 support private school choice.).
220. Mark R. Killenbeck, Pushing Things up to Their First Principles: Reflections
on the Values of Affirmative Action, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 1299 (1999) (A properly designed
school choice system, like affirmative action policies, specifically helps those suffering
the most from the lingering effects of discrimination throughout society's history. Both
seek in the long term to bring a historically oppressed community to the socioeconomic
position that they would have occupied but for the historical public and private discrimination.)
221. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Silent Resurrection of Plessy: The Supreme Court's Ac-
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Whereas the desegregation movement combats racial isolation and inadequate resources through achieving racial balance, the school choice movement seeks to improve educational quality through maximizing school choice at all levels
and without constraints ... the kind of private choice that is
involved in school choice generally means maximizing choices
that increase segregation. Because the emphasis is on lack of
constraints, these policies could lead to increase in school seg.
222
regahon.

The choice-causes-resegregation argument is faulty because
the reasoning behind the criticism assumes that the choice
plan adopted would be available to every student. For example,
there are choice plans where "vouchers" would be available
223
only to those children with need. Under such a design, middle- and upper-class whites would not be given a voucher to use
as a tool to resegregate. Critics often emphasize that the first
school choice programs were implemented in the south during
224
the 1960's as an effort to resist desegregation. However, it is
possible to steal the idea of southern racists, and ironically,
adapt it to a better use as a tool for racial justice.
Another set of powerful interest groups such as the People
for the American Way (PFAW) and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) strongly oppose school choice citing the constitutional issue of government funding touching religious
schools. These groups have adopted a philosophy that there
should be a strict separation of church and state under the
225
First Amendment.
Next to the teachers' unions, PFAW has become the nation's leading opponent of the "voucher" component of any
226
school choice reform. A perusal of PFAW's literature reveals
that their opposition to vouchers stems mainly from a fierce poquiescence in the Resegregation olAmerica's Schools, 9 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rights L. Rev.
1, 56 (1999).
222. Raquel Aldana, When the Free-Market Visits Public Schools: Answering the
Roll Call lor Disadvantaged Students, 15 Nat!. Black L.J. 26, 49 (1998) (citing David J.
Armor, Forced Justice: School Desegregation and the Law 226 (Oxford U. Press 1995)).
223. For an example of how a school choice plan can be properly drafted to virtually eliminate resegregation concerns see Part V inlra.
224. See Aldana, supra n. 222, at 51; see also McGroarty, supra n. 16, at 189-90;
Viteritti, supra n. 18, at 29.
225. See Schrag, supra n. 191; American Civil Liberties Union, Church and State,
ACLU
Briefing Paper (ACLU
updated
Summer
1999) (available
at
<http://www.aclu.org/library/church_state99.pdf>) (accessed Nov. 22, 2000).
226. Schrag, supra n. 191.
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litical op:position to the Religious Right and any issue that it
227
supports.
PFAW's use of scorched earth tactics in its war
against right-wing extremists severely damages the fertile territory in which the seeds of true racial equality may be planted.
PFAW's valid opposition to right-wing extremists unfortunately blinds them to the potential of improving education
228
through a system of school choice.
The ACLU promotes the principle of strict separation of
church and state by opposing school choice reform where
229
vouchers are redeemable at parochial schools.
The ACLU
"oppose[s] school vouchers for parochial schools because they
take taxpayer funds away from the public school system and
give then to religious institutions in violation of the separation
230
of church and state." However, in the ACLU's effort to maintain a separation, it practices overkill by opposing any form of
vouchers. Like PFAW, the ACLU sacrifices some of the same
values it cherishes. For example, the ACLU supports affirma231
tive action in order to remedy past discrimination.
Schoolchoice vouchers could also serve the same purpose in righting
past wrongful discrimination. The ACLU has sponsored nu227. People For the American Way, About the Religious Right, <
http://www.pfaw.org/issues/rightl> (accessed Nov. 22, 2000) (The People For the American Way devotes a large portion of its website to its opposition to the Religious Right,
including:
[PFAW] has been tracking the activities of the Religious Right political movement
for 19 years, in that time amassing the nation's largest resource of Religious Right
materials. Our National Resource Center contains a variety of Religious Right
documents, audio tapes, videotapes and more. People For the American Way Foundation is the nation's pre-eminent expert on the day-to-day activities of the
Religious Right. This essential "watchdog" work involves keeping exhaustive records of what ultraconservative groups communicate to their own target audiences; being there to tell the truth when they deceptively tailor their messages for
the mainstream media; and helping to organize other groups and communities to
defeat the Religious Right.)
228. In fact, the PFAW supports the values that underlie the theory behind a progressive school choice system. Educational reform based on progressive school choice
seeks, to a large degree, to remedy the effects of past discrimination (here, the historic
and continuing isolation and impoverishment of a disproportionate number of minorities in urban areas) against minorities and "thus to open the doors of opportunity to all
Americans based on individual experience and ability." See People For the American
Way,
Statement
of
Position
on
Affirmative
Action,
<http://www.pfaw.org/issues/equaVaffirmative-action.shtml> (accessed Nov. 22, 2000).
229. American Civil Liberties Union, supra n. 225.
230. American Civil Liberties Union, Affirmative Action, ACLU Briefing Paper
(ACLU updated Fall 2000) <http://www.aclu.org/library/affirmative_action99.pdf> (accessed Nov. 22, 2000).
231. !d.
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merous lawsuits against school choice-based education legislation and is very active in the political debate against choice
2~2
programs.

3. The Confluence of Political Barriers to School Choice
The recent passage of education reform bills in Congress
demonstrates the effects of the confluence of all of the political
barriers to school choice described above. The fierce and often
unsubstantiated opposition to any form of choice creates a
background of false assumptions and rhetoric (primarily centered around the evil 'voucher') that any form of choice-based
education reform must overcome. The Congressional debate
over the Bush Administration's attempt to experiment with
private school choice provides numerous examples of this problem.
Many false assumptions about school choice or 'vouchers'
prevent policymakers from creating meaningful education reform. First, voucher critics misunderstand the basic concept of
233
public education.
These critics believe "public schools" and
232. The PF AW and the ACLU are only two of many examples of the powerful organizations opposed to any school choice plan that includes vouchers. The bases for
their opposition to vouchers is significantly grounded in faulty assumptions and as a
result places them in a position opposite to the values that the organizations strongly
hold. This shows how the nature of politics in contemporary America can impede the
acceptance of policies aimed at social progress.
233. There are several examples of this fallacy during the Congressional debates
over voucher experiment amendments. Congresswoman Lynne Woolsey (D-CA), 147
Cong. Rec. H2593 (daily ed. May 23, 2001) ("Mr. Chairman, a sound public school system is the backbone of our Nation, and it is the way to prepare all children for the highskill, high-wage jobs that will ensure America's leadership in the world marketplace
and will prevent at the same time dependency on welfare here at home. Public education is the backbone of our country. It is why we are a great Nation. Public education is
available to all. It does not discriminate, and it must be strengthened, not weakened.");
Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX), 147 Cong. Rec. H2599 (daily ed. May 23,
2001) ("Mr. Chairman, I can answer the question what do we have to lose. Primarily
what we have to lose is this country's basic commitment to the little red schoolhouse.
That is what America was built on. As communities organized, they formulated the
public community school. It opened the doors of opportunity. And as the slaves were
freed, and even before so, they knew that education was a key element to their success,
and they moved themselves to the little red schoolhouses and other schoolhouses that
were promoted by local governments. As immigrants came, they were able to improve
their status in life as we opened the doors of education ... There is a long tradition in
the United States that supports the notion of a free public education for all of our nation's children."); Senator Patty Murray (D-WA), 147 Cong. Rec. S6070 (daily ed. J~ne
12 2001) ("Our public schools are the cornerstone of our democracy, our commumtJes,
and our economy. They are entrusted with giving more than 90 percent of our children
the education they need to be productive citizens."); Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton

106

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2002

"public education" are synonymous, and they cite the historical
success and tradition of public schools. However, public education does not necessarily equate to public schools. Public education is the government's commitment to provide each of its
young citizens the socialization, knowledge, and skills necessary to become a productive member of society. Public schools
are a means to this end, but contrary to popular belief, public
schools are not the only means of providing public education. A
student can receive a public education even though he/she attends a private institution or is taught at home. As long as the
government is providing the funds for the child to receive an
education, the government is providing public education.
Opponents of school choice fight to maintain the public
school system because they perceive it to be a fundamental tradition. School choice opponents thus mistakenly place their
loyalty in the public school system rather than placing loyalty
in the nation's commitment to free public education. They fail
to see that preservation of this "tradition" is worthless to those
children trapped in ineffective schools.
Second, school choice opponents frequent!?; assert that
34
vouchers take money away from public schools.
However, a
(D-NY), 147 Cong. Rec. S6075 (daily ed. June 12, 2001) ("Public schools, for me, are the
distinguishing characteristic that sets us apart from many other societies. They are the
bedrock of our democracy. I don't think we would be giving up on any of our fundamental freedoms so easily. I don't think we would be turning our back on our Constitution
or our Bill of Rights. Yet without a strong public school system, we could, in effect, be
doing just that."); Senator John Corzine (D-NJ), 147 Cong. Rec. S6085 (daily ed. June
12, 2001) ("I believe this amendment is misguided because it would undermine the
public education system that is the very tie that binds our society .... If we adopt this
vouchers measure, we would drain limited resources from our public schools and send a
signal that we are prepared to erode the historical purpose and position of public education in America.").
234. Again, the recent Congressional debate provides ample examples of this assumption. Congressman George Miller (D-CA), 147 Cong. Rec. E96 (daily ed. Feb. 1,
2001) ("Let me clear about the differences between our bill and the approach taken by
President Bush. Our bill would not divert public funds from public schools to private
and religious schools, through vouchers or through any other means."); Congresswoman Betty McCollum (D-MN), 147 Cong. Rec. H2402 (daily ed. May 7, 2001)
("Vouchers take away scarce resources from our children and provide no accountability
for our tax dollars."); Congressman David Price (D-NC), 147 Cong. Rec. H2408 (daily
ed. May 7, 2001) ("We will face an amendment to provide public funding for private
school vouchers, which would siphon money away from public education, not
strengthen it."); Congresswoman Loretta Sanchez (D-CA), 147 Cong. Rec. H2409 (daily
ed. May 7, 2001) ("This bill also removes provisions diverting funds from public schools,
whatever the newest name for them are, including private school choice."); Delegate
Donna Christensen (D-VI), 147 Cong. Rec. 2409 (daily ed. May 7, 2001) ("Mr. Chairman, our public schools are plagued with enough problems already. We don't need to
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progressive school choice program can and should couple
vouchers for students with an increase of funding for the inadequate public school. The twisted logic that money not spent
on public schools is money drained from public education is just
add to those problems by taking funding away from our schools in the form of vouchers."); Congressman Lacy Clay (D-MO), 147 Cong. Rec. H2592 (daily ed. May 23, 2001)
("Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment being offered by the gentleman
from Texas. At a time when public schools are struggling to rebuild antiquated and
crumbling school facilities and deal with a record enrollment of over 52 million students, we should not be considering proposals that divert scarce taxpayer dollars from
our public school systems to subsidize private and religious schools."); Congresswoman
Lynn Woolsey (D-CA), 147 Cong. Rec. H2593 (daily ed. May 23, 2001) ("Why is it that
voucher supporters go on and on about our poor-performing public schools and do not
have a plan to make all schools the best in the world? Instead, they support vouchers
that take precious education dollars out of our public school system and give them to
private and religious schools."); Congressman Joe Baca (D-CA), 147 Cong. Rec. H2593
(daily ed. May 23, 2001) ("What it will do, it will simply drain our resources from those
schools most in need of help, while providing minimum benefits to students. It will raid
the system, bleeding and hemorrhaging, when we should be funding education at the
highest level."); Congressman David Wu (D-OR), 147 Cong. Rec. H 2593 (daily ed. May
23, 2001) ("It is bad policy because this amendment would propose to strip-mine public
resources away from public schools and give them to private institutions. I think that is
wrong."); Congressman George Miller (D-CA), 147 Cong. Rec. H2596 (daily ed. May 23,
2001) ("The harm it does is in draining the resources that are necessary."); Congressman Donald M. Payne (D-NJ), 147 Cong. Rec. H2598 (daily ed. May 23, 2001) ("It is
ironic that the sponsors of this legislation are fighting for voucher provisions while the
title of the bill is Leave No Child Behind. If we take dollars continually out of the public school system, we are going to leave many, many children behind."); Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX), 147 Cong. Rec. H2599(daily ed. May 23, 2001)
("Vouchers divert scarce funds away from public schools-which 90% of all students in
this country attend. Siphoning off limited public school funds from low-performing
schools leaves the children in those schools with even fewer resources."); Congressman
Gene Green (D-TX), 147 Cong. Rec. H2602 (daily ed. May 23, 2001) ("Vouchers go the
opposite way of the intent of this bill. It takes money away from public schools."); Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA), 147 Cong. Rec. S6068 (daily ed. June 12, 2001) ("Supporters
of this amendment also claim that the $50 million to fund this program will not come
from Title I. If not from Title I, then from where? This investment in vouchers has been
portrayed as an investment that would not siphon funds in the federal budget away
from education. Where in the world is this magic $50 million coming from? I don't know
where it is. It is out here. They keep referring to it. I think we ought to take that magical pot with a never-ending fountain, invest it, and try to do something that is going to
make a difference; that is, address the problems of failing schools. That is what we
ought to be doing. But that is not the proposal here. This $50 million is, of course,
money that could otherwise be spent in terms of helping and assisting schools. Under
this amendment, schools in need of assistance would lose."); Senator Barbara Boxer (DCA), 14 7 Cong. Rec. 86073 (daily ed. June 12, 2001) ("That is why I strongly oppose the
Gregg amendment. I think any effort in this Chamber to pull money away from our
public schools before we know whether they are qualified, before we know that we are
giving every child what he or she deserves to have, anything that pulls that money
away from the public school system is absolutely wrong on its face."); Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT), 147 Cong. Rec. S6084 (daily ed. June 12, 2001) ("Instead, vouchers
take scarce resources from public schools that desperately need them.").
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that, twisted. As demonstrated above, the government designates the funds, whether for use in home schools, private
schools, or public schools, for the benefit of public education. An
effective school-choice reform would not fund vouchers instead
of public schools, but adds vouchers in addition to increasing
the funding of inadequate public schools.
The third common misconception about school choice is that
the ultimate choice of which school the student will attend
rests with the private schools and not with the student because
the private institution can refuse admission for virtually any
23
reason. :, A related argument is that private schools are not ac236
countable in the same way public schools are. Both of these
arguments are premised on the assumption that the government cannot regulate private schools. This is not necessarily
true.
While critics correctly point out that the most recent
voucher manifestation failed to guarantee access to and accountability from private schools, that does not mean that it is
impossible to craft legislation that does. The truth is that the
237
government already regulates private schools, and more coercive governmental regulation is justified by compelling governmental and societal interests in providing adequate educa238
tion for the most at-risk children.
To quell the access and accountability fears of school choice
opponents, states should require private schools to meet basic
educational standards and prohibit private schools from rejecting the few underprivileged students exercising state- or feder2'J9
ally-funded choice. · However, recent debate perpetuates the
false assumption that it is impossible to mandate accountability from, and access to, private schools for the few students who
240
are eligible for government funded choice. A recent statement

235. See Moe, supra n. 4, at 302.
236. See id at 297-300, 341-42.
237. It is quite a stretch for choice critics to suggest that the government has no
power to regulate private schools. For example, Maryland requires all schools to obtain
a certificate of approval from the State Board of Education. See Md. Educ. Code Ann. §
2-206 (2001).
238. See Moe, supra n. 4, at 297-300, 341-42, 355.
239. ld.
240. The following statements illustrate the assumption that private schools are
not or cannot be regulated by the government: Congressman Tim Roemer (D-IN), 147
Cong. Rec. H2590 (daily ed. May 23, 2001) ("This amendment has no accountability in
it. We take the money with the voucher from the public school to a private school, and
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then there is no accountability there. No test, no trail, no nothing. As a student, as
somebody who went to Catholic schools, I am not sure that we want those Catholic
schools having to be accountable to the government for curriculum, for testing, for
other things."); Congressman Earl Blumenauer (D-OR), 147 Cong. Rec. H2592 (daily
ed. May 23, 2001) ("There has been a lot of talk on the floor about access; but unlike
public schools, which serve all children, private schools are not obligated to accept any
student. Students that are the most vulnerable and the more difficult and expensive to
educate are left out ... .In fact, the Department of Education report shows that if required to accept special needs students, 85 percent of the private schools said they
would not even participate in a voucher program. It is wrong to divert critical funding
from our public schools, especially when all children will not have equal access."); Congressman Joe Baca (D-CA), 147 Cong. Rec. H2593 (daily ed. May 23, 2001) ("When we
talk about accountability, there will be accountability in our public schools. When we
talk about accountability in our private schools, there will not be accountability.");
Congressman Earl Blumenauer (D-OR), 147 Cong. Rec. H2603 (daily ed. May 23, 2001)
("Unlike public schools, which serve all children, private schools are not obligated to
accept any student. Students who arc most vulnerable and are often more difficult and
expensive to educate are left out. In fact, a Department of Education report showed
that if required to accept special needs students, 85% of private schools said they would
not participate in a voucher program."); Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA), 147 Cong. Rec.
S6068 (daily ed. June 12, 2001) ("They do not have to take your child. And they don't,
more often than not. If your child has a disability, forget about going because they do
not have to take your child. IDEA doesn't apply to this. There is reference in here that
IDEA applies. But it doesn't apply to private schools. If they are disabled, forget about
going. If they have a disability, forget about bringing your child in. If you are a homeless or migrant student, you will not be guaranteed services. You have no guarantee.
Forget about going to that school. ... Private schools are not required to have assessments in their programs in the manner that the President has talked about. They are
able to be selective about who will attend their schools."); Senator Patty Murray (DWA), 147 Cong. Rec. S6070 (daily ed. June 12, 2001) ("In the bill before us, we are insisting on accountability for the use of Federal funds. This voucher program would
funnel taxpayer dollars into schools that are not accountable to the public at aU. Beyond lack of accountability, let's remember that private schools don't even have to meet
the same academic standards required for all public schools. Not all private schools are
created equal. There are a lot of good ones, but there are some with lower quality and
lower standards, and our tax dollars would go to them as well with no accountability.");
Senator Jack Reed (D-RI), 147 Cong. Rec. S6068 (daily ed. June 12, 2001) ("First, giving a voucher to a family for their child does not ensure that child can go to the school
the family chooses. Frankly, the nature of private education is they exclude students.
They exclude students because they are not smart enough. They exclude students because they just do not fit in with their approach to education. They exclude students
because, frankly, they are difficult or have discipline problems. Public education cannot
do that. Public education has to be inclusive. Public education has to reach out and
embrace every child-those who are difficult and those who are honor students.");
Senator John Kerry CD-MA), 147 Cong. Rec. S6085 (daily ed. June 12, 2001) ("Voucher
programs create the potential for discrimination. Awarding a voucher to a family does
not guarantee that the student will be accepted into a private school."); Senator John
Corzine (D-NJ), 14 7 Cong. Rec. 86085 (daily ed. ,June 12, 2001) ("Contrary to the rhetoric, vouchers would not ensure parental choice, because private schools can and do reject applicants for private reasons-including disability or language skills. In fact, the
only real choice vouchers will create is in the hands of the private schools .... In addition to vouchers setting up a false choice, vouchers provide no accountability."); Senator
Ted Kennedy CD-MA), 147 Cong. Rec. S6087 (daily ed. June 12, 2001) ("The voucher
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on the Senate floor by Senator Patty Murray advanced this
false assumption: "While parents may remove children from
public schools, no voucher system guarantees admission to the
school of their choice. Private schools will still choose which
241
students they will admit." Again, the assumption that state
and federal governments cannot and have not regulated the
private schools is untrue. Imposing access and accountability
requirements on private schools is certainly possible and perhaps necessary for broad choice-based education reform. The
imposition seems harsh to private school administrators, but
such requirements are justified by the compelling need of the
242
government to educate its most at-risk citizens.
The various legal and political hurdles mentioned in the
preceding sections make the implementation of any broad,
choice-based educational reform very difficult. Choice-centered
education reforms will continue to seem impossible as long as
the debate in Congress and the states remain beholden to protectionist interests and mired in rhetoric of false assumptions.
Policymakers must design a school-choice system that addresses these concerns and debunks the myths held by critics of
school choice proposals.
V. PROPOSAL: CONSTRUCTING A FEASIBLE SCHOOL CHOICE
SYSTEM

Policymakers need plenty of courage and patience to overcome legal and political resistance to providing equal educational opportunity to each child regardless of his or her racial,
economic, or religious background. A proposal for an education
system based on school choice must be designed to address the
legal issues and political concerns that have traditionally impeded similar reform measures.

issue isn't about the choice of a child. It is the choice for the school. ... The Senator
from New Hampshire is going to modify his amendment to make sure children who
have some disability or special needs will be able to be included, and that children can
be selected on the basis of lottery. Still, it will be up to the school, but that is certainly
an improvement.").
241. Senator Patty Murray (D-WA), 147 Cong. Rec. S6070 (daily ed. June 12,
2001).
242. See Moe, supra n. 4, at 297-300, 307-08, 341-42, 355.
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A Overcoming Legal Barriers
1. Religious "Choice" Schools

To be effective, a choice-based education system needs to
include religious schools among the choice options. It is possible to do so in without violating the Establishment Clause and
state constitutional provisions calling for a separation between
church and state.
School-choice systems that seek to develop equal educational opportunities for each child regardless of socio-economic
background must include religious schools for several reasons.
First, excluding parochial schools from a school-choice program
causes difficulties that are unique to minority and urban communities. Viteritti explains the premise of the difficulty in the
following way: "Separation of church and state is a white middle class legal and social construct that is out of step with the
ethos of the black community and undermines the black com243
munity's most significant local institution." Many black leaders emerge from the local clergy and are subsequently denied
permission to start charter schools. However, the few clergy
members who have been granted permission to open charter
schools have demonstrated that there is no foundation to separationists' fears because there is no evidence that clergy mem. . In
. sch oo1244
.
b ers promot e re11g10n
Impoverished members of highly religious minority groups
are not only denied equal educational opportunity by schoolchoice plans that exclude parochial schools, but are denied
their constitutionally-protected right to free exercise of relig245
ion.
While middle-class parents are allowed to make value243. Viteritti, supra n. 18, at 20 (citing Robert Woodson, The Triumphs of Joseph:
How Today's Community Healers Are Reviving Our Streets and Neighborhoods (Free
Press 1998); Signs of Hope in the City: Ministries of Community Renewal (Robert D.
Carle & Louis A. DeCarlo eds., Judson Press 1997); Samuel G. Freedman, Upon This
Rock: The Miracle of a Black Church (HarperCollins 1993); C. Eric Lincoln & Lawrence
H. Mamiya, The Black Church in the African-American Experience (Duke U. Press
1990); Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954-63 (Simon
& Schuster 1988); David Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King and the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (Morrow 1986); Aldon M. Morris, The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change (Free
Press 1984); Hart M. Nelson & Ann K. Nelson, The Black Church in the Sixties (U.
Press of Ky. 1975)).
244. Id. at 206.
245. Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court and Religious Liberty, 40 Catholic L. 25,
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based choices on which school their children will attend, less
affluent children may be trapped in public schools that promote
246
ideas contrary to their religious beliefs. In that way, it is easy
to see how the denial of Free Exercise argument is valid.
Another reason why parochial schools should be included in
school-choice plans is because they work. A study by sociologist
James Coleman found that parochial schools have more effectively reduced the performance gap between students of differ247
ent socio-economic backgrounds than public schools. A study
by the Rand Corporation in 1990 of low-income minority stu248
dents found similar results.
Finally, allowing parochial schools in choice plans will add
more schools for students to choose from, especially in urban
249
areas. A large percentage of private schools are linked to religious institutions. Excluding religious schools from a schoolchoice program will severely limit the options available to parents, especially considering the restrictions in place to the development of charter schools. For a choice plan to be effective
there must be numerous options available.
2. Desegregation and School Choice

Many scholars argue that a school-choice or voucher system
will disrupt the racial balance found in the public schools and
eventually lead to a resegregation of American education.
While these critics overlook the current prevalence of de facto
segregation in public schools, especially within urban districts

48-56 (2000); Catherine L. Crisham, Note, The Writing is on the Wall of Separation:
Why the Supreme Court Should and Will Uphold Full-Choice School Voucher Programs, 89 Geo. L.J. 225, 237 (2000).
246. Viteritti, supra n. 18, at 120.
247. !d. at 81.
248. Jason T. Vail, Comment, School Vouchers and the Establishment Clause: Is
the First Amendment a Barrier to Improving Education for Low Income Children?, :35
Gonz. L. Rev. 187, 207 (2000) (citing Nina H. Shokraii, Why Do At-Risk Students
Thrive In Catholic Schools?, USA Today, May 1, 1998, at 62) ("The study found that
the Catholic schools, which had student populations of 75-9Q<f,; African-American and
Hispanic, graduated 95% of their students each year, as compared to a just over 50%
graduation rate for similar public high schools. Not only do Catholic students graduate
at a higher rate than their public school counterparts, they do so having achieved a
stronger academic experience. Over two-thirds of graduates from Catholic schools in
the study received the New York State Regents diploma, which represents completion
of a highly demanding college preparatory curriculum, whereas only five percent of
public school graduates received the same diploma.").
249. Viteritti, supra n. 18, at 83.
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and within schools using "tracking," their argument is quite
justified when applied to a worst-case scenario, open, universal
school-choice program. However, the resegregation argument
clearly fails when confronted with a school-choice system designed to promote equal educational opportunity across socioeconomic classes. These critics apply a shallow analysis of
school-choice and consequently fail to see how a properly designed school-choice system can be used similarly to affirmative action programs to promote short- and long-term racial desegregation of schools and American society.
School-choice and affirmative action are fraternal twins
born together from the same principles and bearing few differences. Both seek to promote racial equality and rectifY the effects of past and present discrimination. A properly designed
system of school-choice should only be open to children from
historically disadvantaged classes who would otherwise be assigned to an inadequate public school so that they can have the
same access to quality education; and as a result, careers; as
more affluent, predominantly white children. Affirmative action programs have essentially sought the same goal: to deliver
access to quality education and/or employment for members of
groups that have suffered the effects of the nation's history of
251
discrimination.

B. Designing a Progressive School Choice System
It has been asserted throughout this paper that a carefullydesigned educational system based on school choice can successfully overcome legal and political barriers to implementation and provide a great tool to ensure that poor and minority
students receive a quality education. A progressive school
choice system should have the following features:

250. Aldana, supra n. 222, at 49 (1998) (citing William Celis III, Study Finds Rising Concentration of Black and Hispanic Students, N.Y. Times A1 (Dec. 14, 1993) ("[A]
lr]ecently published report of a study of American public education reveals that racial
segregation in our schools has reached the highest levels since 1968, the year that the
Court decided Green 1!. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), The Harvard Project on
School Desegregation reports that 4.6 million of the nations' 6.9 million African American and 3.7 million of the 5 million Hispanic public school students attended predominantly minority schools in the 1991-92 academic year.").
251. See Killenbeck, supra n. 220.
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1. Targeted Participation
The government should only open the school-choice program to families who 1) demonstrate economic need and 2)
whose children are assigned to inadequate public schools. By
narrowing the scope of participants in the choice program, the
proposal answers those critics who claim that choice will lead
to resegregation, will damage public schools with a mass exodus, and will overburden the government fiscally.

2. Maximum Number of Available Options
A system of school choice should allow garents to decide to
2 2
send their child to any school they wish. · The school-choice
program should include all public schools in any district or any
private schools, including parochial schools.
States should provide charter school laws that promote the
opening of many charter schools, yet continue to hold them to
high academic standards. One possibility for spurring the
growth of charter schools would be to offer low-interest loans to
those wishing to found a school. This would likely help urban
communities who wish to create a new, effective neighborhood
school. Allowing for the creation of a large number of charter
schools will spur competition for innovation within public
schools and provide more options for parents to choose from.
Parochial schools should be included among the options
with a requirement that parents be allowed to have their children opt out of religious instruction and prayer. To avoid constitutional issues, public funds for education must first be
made available without regard to the institution benefited.
Thus, funds should be made available on a basis that neither
favors nor disfavors religion and be distributed directly to families who can then make the private, independent decision to
apply the government educational grant to a religious school.
To take advantage of the benefits of educational competition, a
school choice system should allow for the maximum possible
options for parents.

252. Of course, considering transportation costs, the school must be within a relatively close distance from the child's home. It is not reasonable to expect the government and taxpayers pay to send a child who lives in Washington, D.C. every day to a
school in Denver via private plane.
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3. Funding School Choice for Disadvantaged Children While
Protecting Existing Public Schools
When the state bestows upon itself the burden of providing
free public education, it should do so on an equal basis. The
state should not shirk this responsibility. The costs a state pays
to educate a public school student should be paid for a schoolchoice student as well. The state covers more than just the tuition cost of public schooling. The government grant given to
impoverished students for school choice should cover all educational expenses for that underprivileged child including tuition,
books, transportation, and uniforms. In order for choice to be
free and effective, families should not be faced with additional
253
financial burdens resulting from choosing a better education.
In providing full educational funding for choice students,
the government is faced with an increased financial burden. It
is important to note again that a progressive school choice system would only subsidize the choice of a limited number of
children: those below a certain family income level who would
otherwise attend a known inadequate school. While this does
mitigate the financial burden posed by such a system, it does
leave a large number of students in the public school system.
Therefore, the rate of funding for the public school system
should be maintained. Public school systems that adopt school
choice should sever any link between actual enrollment figures
and individual school funding. Thus, when a child chooses to go
to a private school his decision will not adversely affect the district he/she left behind. This funding arrangement should serve
as a catalyst for improvement, as the failing school would in
fact receive more funds to educate fewer students. However,
this still leaves the government with a significantly increased
cost of the new school choice system.
The state has a moral and financial interest in providing an
education despite short-term increased costs. The proposed
plan limits school-choice system to low-income families with
children attending inadequate schools. Financially, the state

253. See Recess on Vouchers, The News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.) A30 (Editorial,
June 17, 2001) (Most voucher proposals to date do not provide even the full amount to
cover tuition at the average private school. The recent Bush administration proposal of
approximately $1,500 falls short.)
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already covers the cost of unemployment, welfare, incarceration, and disability. These costs can be avoided in the future
through education. One should also consider that poverty is a
multi-generational phenomenon. Children who have received
an inadequate public education have grown up to have their
own children who, like their parents and grandparents, are
trapped in inadequate schools. Breaking this cycle is not only
the right thing to do; it is the cheapest thing to do. The longterm, cost-benefit analysis justifies increased investment for
impoverished children currently trapped inadequate schools.
C. A Hypothetical School Choice Budget

To demonstrate the cost of a robust school choice system,
consider the following statistics and hypothetical choice program. A properly designed school choice system must pay for
all educational expenses typically provided by traditional public schools. Recent estimates show the average private school
254
tuition varies widely, ranging from $3,000 to $7,500. Therefore, erring on the side of caution, a fully-funded "voucher" for
all education expenses allocates up to $8,000, per student, per
school year.
The second part of the cost equation determines how many
students will receive the $8,000 per year grant. Again, a properly drafted school choice system should only benefit children
below a certain poverty level and who would otherwise attend
an inadequate public school. For this proposed plan, the number of students eligible for reduced price lunch provides the
count of impoverished students. The use of Texas, a large state,
and Maryland, a medium state, is appropriate for this hypothetical because these states have provided ample data to the
National Center for Education Statistics. According to recent
data, in Texas, 1, 776,756 public school students were eligible
for reduced price lunch. In Maryland, 256,441 public school
255
students were eligible for reduced price lunch.

254. See Andrew Goldstein, Setback for Vouchers, Time 142 (Dec. 25, 2000); The
Center for Education Reform, Elementary and Secondary Education Statistics at a
Glance, <http://www.edreform.com/pubs/edstats.htm> (accessed July 25, 2001); Dan D.
Goldhaber, School Choice as Education Reform, Phi Delta Kappan 143 (Oct. 1997);
Judy Walton, Scholarship Foundation Supports School Vouchers, Chattanooga Times
A1 (Nov. 3, 2000).
255. See National Center for Education Statistics, Overview of Public Elementary
and Secondary Schools and Districts: School Year 1998-1999, NCES 2000-333R (U.S.
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The next step in calculating the number of participants is
determining how many of the underprivileged students actually attend or would be assigned to attend an inadequate public
school under the current school system. Although there is no
standard nor mandatory measurement of individual school performance, assume for present purposes 40 percent of these im256
poverished students attend inadequate schools.
The final calculation of the cost of this hypothetical schoolchoice program multiplies the number of eligible students by
the maximum allocated grant. To fully fund the education of
choice students in such a program would be $5.7 billion in
Texas and $820 million in Maryland. To put these numbers in
perspective, consider that in 1999 the total state and local government education appropriation in Texas was $23.8 billion
257
and in Maryland $6.3 billion.
That amounts to increases of
24 percent in Texas and 13 percent in Maryland. However, if
the federal government agrees to increase its commitment to
education by providing additional funding to impoverished students in failing schools - assume a dollar for dollar contribution - the state's burden is reduced significantly. In the federal
matching funds scenario, Texas state and local governments
together would only have to appropriate an additional $2.85
billion (a twelve percent education budget increase) for a properly drafted school choice program and Maryland $410 million
258
(a seven and a half percent increase). With the commitment
by state and federal government, this can be done while continuing to increase the funding to traditional public schools.

D. The Choice Process
The ability to successfully bring together an impoverished
child and the effective school of his or her choice depends on
Dept.
of
Educ.
June
2000)
(available
online
at
<h ttp://nces.ed. gov/pubs2000/2000333. pdf>).
256. While this may seem like a gross overestimation of the number of failing
schools, keep in mind that the poorer students disproportionately attend substandard
schools. Therefore, the percentage of poor children attending inadequate schools should
be higher than the percentage of inadequate schools overall.
257. See Statistical Abstract of' the United States: 2000, 172 (U.S. Census Bureau,
last
revised
Feb.
14,
2001)
(full
text
available
online
at
<http://www.census.gov/statab/www/>).
258. Id. at 221, 388 (To further put this school choice budget in perspective consider that Texas spends $6.485 billion annually on unemployment benefits and prison
costs combined annually; while Maryland spends $1.482 billion.).

118

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2002

quality information and equal access to choice schools. In order
for parents to make good decisions regarding the quality of
education they wish to provide for their children, they must
have access to complete and accurate information about the options available. The government, as part of a school choice system, must establish a mechanism for providing parents with
the knowledge to make an informed decision. A separate governmental unit may have to be created to collect, record, and
communicate the information about the schools to the families
in the choice program.
Since the choice program would only include impoverished
families, the information must be communicated in an accessi259
ble and understandable method/way. Posting the information
on a website will not suffice. The information should be disseminated in different languages and via multiple media mediums in order to assure dissemination to the diverse parents
found within impoverished communities.
A choice plan should ensure that all families have equal access to the school of their choice. Admission should be granted
on a first come-first serve or lottery basis. This feature addresses the 'skimming' concern whereby a private school selects
only the students who are academically or athletically successful. This policy is necessary for a school-choice program to
achieve its goal of providing an equal educational opportunity.
E. Evaluating a School Choice System

Virtually upon the day of its implementation, a schoolchoice system will be subject to intense scrutiny by proponents
and opponents alike to see whether the program has its intended effect. However short and impatient American society's
attention span is, the public must keep in mind that systemic
reforms such as school choice are designed to promote longterm change, and consequently, will not produce results over. ht .260
mg
Evaluators should consider that the transition period following the implementation of a new educational system based
259. See Aldana, supra n. 222, at 43-46 ("The information will need to be available
in the various languages and will require that it be explained in lay-terms and in the
language of the recipient. The dissemination of this information will also demand intensive outreach efforts in the less traditional channels (i.e. ethnic radio stations,
newspapers, community workshops, and churches).").
260. Peterson, supra n. 87, at 396.
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on school choice may dampen the results in the short term. For
example, even school-choice proponents fail to explain that the
effectiveness of any reform effort will be diminished significantly by the fact that the current generation of students, especially those from lower socio-economic backgrounds that the
choice system is specifically designed to help, have unfortunately been under the auspices of an inadequate educational
system for years. Being educated in an inadequate system pollutes a student's ability to accept and perform under a "new"
educational method.
This point was illustrated in Educational Opportunity in an
Urban American High School, in which author Patrick James
McQuillan described the reaction of students when a new edu261
cational method was attempted by teachers.
McQuillan observed the effort of three teachers implementing a U.S. history
curriculum that differed significantly from the students' previous educational experience. He observed that the students actively resisted the new program by drawing collectively on
their shared sense of "real school" and a definition of reasonable teacher expectation to justify their rejection of the
changes. McQuillan concluded that by resisting changes the
students "enacted their informal power so as to implicate
themselves in their own educational failure - in terms of the
grades they received, the skills they never developed, and how
their actions reinforced faculty perceptions of student indifference."262
Such resistance by students moving into choice schools will
initially impede the positive results of any broad school-choice
program. This will, in effect, provide heavy ammunition to
choice opponents seeking to curb the spread of such a plan to
other states.
McQuillan's work brings into question the usefulness of the
common methodology that has been used to evaluate previous
263
choice programs.
To determine whether school-choice programs successfully provide equal educational opportunity, the
studies should be designed to address the question: "Does the
choice school successfully give the child from the lower socio261. Patrick James McQuillan, Educational Opportunity in an Urban American
High School, 23-56 (St. Univ. N.Y. Press 1998).
262. Id. at 24.
263. See the discussion of the evaluations of the Milwaukee and Cleveland school
choice programs supra at Part III (B)(4).
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economic background a better quality education than the public
school they would have been assigned to?" The previous studies
fail to answer this question because their methodology did not
include a real control group. The choice school students that
were used in the comparison frequently entered the choice
school with the imprint of an inadequate public education provided at the school they chose to leave. A more accurate study
would compare students at a choice school who had never set
foot in a regular public school with students at a public school
where the choice students would have been assigned. The effectiveness of this proposed school-choice plan needs to be judged
on a long-term basis, especially by measuring the performance
of the next generation of students who have not been exposed
to inadequate public schooling.
Because a school-choice system is likely to take years to
show positive effects, it should be supplemented with programs
to improve equal educational opportunity in the short-term.
Educational policy-makers must address the education needs of
the children who are currently confined in failing schools at the
same time as they design and implement a system of school
choice for future generations. The recent book, Fixing Urban
Schools, provides one example of a program that can be used to
supplement a school choice system in the interim:
Educationally, the short-term issue is almost always one of
student reading proficiency ... School boards and civic leaders
can address students' direct reading problems even as they
are considering more fundamental structural reforms in the
public education system. As participants in the decisionmaking stimulations used by the Brookings study have suggested, reading scores can be raised on an emergency basis by
creating special triage programs for children whose reading
scores are near enough to meeting state standards so 264
that a
period of accelerated work might put them over the top.
Such a program could help alleviate the immediate shortcomings provided by the inadequate schools as the public waits
for the benefits of a school choice system to materialize.
Finally, the fact that school choice reform is a long-term solution poses a problem because the issue of education is highly
entangled with the political process. Elected officials demand
swift results as the public, and especially their opponents, want

264. Hill & Celio, supra n. 29, at 63-64.
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to know: "What have you done for me lately?" The officials who
have the courage and the will to implement a school choice system must emphasize that school choice is not a quick fix. While
time is a luxury that many individuals cannot afford, its cost is
dwarfed by the expense faced by society for perpetuating a system that denies equal educational opportunity to America's
underprivileged children. By providing underserved populations with choice and removing restrictions that may limit
those choices, the nation will promote racial justice by providing an equal educational opportunity for all.

VI. CONCLUSION
Uncle Sam's conversation with little Johnny under the proposed school choice plan outlined above could look like this ...
"Every boy and girl needs an education to grow up and have
a nice job. So, okay, Johnny, you do not have to go to PS-123.
Pryvatt Academy and St. Praivette's School are both excellent
private schools in your neighborhood."
"Really?!" Johnny exclaims, "How do you know?"
"From their test scores and evaluation reports. If you like,
we have a book, video, and webpage on the schools in multiple
languages that your parents can look through to understand
which school is the best match for your needs."
"Aren't those schools a lot of money?"
"Yes, but my friends on Capitol Hill will help pay for your
education."
Johnny blurts out, "That's great!" After a moment, Johnny
thoughtfully asked, "Not everyone from my school can go to
Pryvatt or St. Praivette's; what about my friends still going to
my old school?"
"We'll make sure they are taken care of also. That school
will get the same amount of money, if not more, that it received
when you attended from my friends on the Hill. The money
that was used to teach you will now help your friends. You will
still be neighbors, so you can still play ball together."
Johnny looked at Uncle Sam warily, "This seems too good to
be true." Then a smile broke across Johnny's face, "My mommy
will be so excited!"
Uncle Sam also smiled but pointed out, "You will still have
to work hard because you might not like how things are taught
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at your choice school. But, after time your children and you
friends' children can choose any school in the neighborhood and
get an excellent education."
In order to realize Johnny's successful education, broad
structural reform of the public education system is necessary.
An educational program based on the progressive school choice
program proposed herein will more equitably distribute quality
education with the long-term effect of diminishing our society's
lingering racial inequalities.

